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THE CONFUSION OF CONFINEMENT SYNDROME: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONFINEMENT OF MENTALLY ILL CRIMINALS AND
FX-CRIMINALS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
GRANT H. MoRxis*
The concept "crime" covers a multitude of sins.1
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE SYNDROME
N the middle ages, mentally ill persons were treated as criminals. Mental
illness was thought to have a diabolical source, and the evil spirits had to
be exorcised from their victims by flagellation, scourging, burning, and other
forms of torture. At that time, confinement for purposes of "treatment" was
accomplished by chaining the unfortunate recipients in dungeons and jails along
with other criminals.2
With enlightenment came reform, and the mentally ill were segregated out
of prisons and placed into separate asylums. These asylums, however, were
merely custodial institutions located in rural settings far from the patient's
home community, and the treatment of mental illness was removed from the
mainstream of medicine to remain static for many years.3 With growing aware-
ness that mental illness is a disease, to be treated as such, the word "asylum"
gained a bad connotation and was "painted over"-figuratively and literally-by
the term "mental hospital." The introduction of electroshock and insulin coma
therapies in the 1930's and psychoactive drugs in the 1950's made modern psy-
chiatric therapy available to the institutionalized mentally ill,4 and these hos-
pitals have finally earned their name.
It is against this background that this article seeks to analyze the con-
nection between treatment of mental illness and confinement of the persons
treated, as these concepts relate to those classes of persons that society has also
labeled "criminal. ' 5 It is the belief of this writer that in the progressive move-
ment to dissociate mentally ill persons from criminals, the pendulum has swung
too far. Although, surely, mentally ill persons should not be treated as criminals,
can it be argued, that in this context, mentally ill criminals should not be treated
as persons? It is submitted, that when the State of New York undertook to create
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law.
1. P. Cantor, Crime, Criminals and Criminal Justice 27 (1932).
2. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Mental Illness and its Treatment S
(1965) ; S.J. Barrows, The Criminal Insane in the United States and in Foreign Countries 5
(1898). Barrows stated that these treatment techniques persisted into the Eighteenth
Century.
3. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, The Comprehensive Community
Mental Health Center 6 (1964).
4. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, supra note 2, at 13-14.
5. The word "criminal" as used in the introduction to this paper, refers not just to
persons convicted of crimes and presently serving sentences, but also to those ex-criminals
who, having completed their sentences, remained tainted by the New York Correction
Law as proper inmates of Matteawan and Dannemora State Hospitals.
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separate institutions for the confinement of those "twice-cursed" ' as both men-
tally ill and criminal, by placing such institutions within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Correction, it created a hybrid, combining not the best, but the
worst aspects of its progenitors, i.e., the prison and the mental hospital. In effect,
what was created was a mental prison.7 The penal setting remains and the prob-
lems of proper treatment inherent in such a setting necessarily remain. I
call this a confusion of confinement. It is a syndrome of a "sick" society.
This article is written with a bias. It is the thesis of this writer that when
society determines that a person has become so mentally ill as to require his
confinement for purposes of treatment, a person so confined should be afforded
both equal treatment and equal confinement, regardless of any other status such
as "criminal" that is attached to him.
II. TE SIGNiFICANCE OF THE SYNDROME
A. The Origins of the Syndrome
In 1836 the Legislature authorized the establishment of the first state hos-
pital in New York-the New York State Lunatic Asylum.8 As originally orga-
nized, that asylum admitted and treated all classes of mental patients, both
civil and criminal.9
The move to segregate mentally ill criminals from mentally ill non-crim-
inals can be traced statutorily to 1855. Chapter 456 of the Laws of 1855 re-
quired the inspectors of the state prisons to "make the necessary and suitable
provisions in one of the state prisons of this state, and the removal to such place
for safe keeping and proper care, all the insane convicts now in the state lunatic
asylum at Utica .... ,,0
Dr. John Ordronaux, later to become the first New York State Commis-
sioner in Lunacy, stated that "The steady increase in the number of insane
discovered among criminals in our prisons, and the impossibility of affording
them suitable treatment in the hospitals attached to such institutions led to
the passage of the above act."'
In this first effort at a systematic classification establishing a distinction
6. But cf. W. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, act IV, sc. 1, lines 179-82:
The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice bless'd:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes(Emphasis added.)
7. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 503 (1960). Dr. Birnbaum
defines the term "mental prison" as a hospital that involuntarily institutionalizes mentally
ill persons without giving them adequate medical treatment for their mental illness. Although
his arguments for a right to treatment are limited to non-criminal patients, see in ra notes
180-94 and accompanying text for an extension of this concept to all mentally ill persons.
8. [1836] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 82.
9. [18421 id. ch. 135.
10. (18S5] id. ch. 456, § 1.
11. J. Ordronaux, The Lunacy Laws of New York, and the Judicial Aspects of In-
sanity 29-30 (1878).
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between criminal and non-criminal mental patients, it was found necessary to
erect a special building with an administration of its own on the grounds of one
of the prisons.' 2 Thus, in 1858, the Legislature enacted a statute 3 to organize
the State Lunatic Asylum for Insane Convicts, designating the building then
being erected at Auburn Prison as that asylum.
The statutes leading to the actual construction of the facility that became
the Matteawan State Hospital can be traced back to 1886. A statute designated
the State Comptroller, The State Commissioner in Lunacy, and the Medical
Superintendent of the State Asylum for Insane Criminals as a commission "to
inquire into and determine as to the best method of meeting the demand for
additional accommodations for, and the expediency of providing suitable farm-
ing lands for the industrial occupation of the inmates of the State Asylum for
Insane Criminals."' 4
For that purpose, the commission was authorized by the Legislature the
following year,' 5 to provide for the selection and purchase of a site and the
erection of suitable buildings to accommodate 450 patients "adapted to the re-
quirements of the criminal insane."' 6
In 1888, $185,000 was appropriated "for the new asylum for insane crim-
inals at Matteawan"' 7 to consist of "two buildings, with lateral connecting cor-
ridors, for the isolation of dangerous and vicious patients.... ,,-s
It may be meaningful to note the change in tenor of the projected purpose
of Matteawan from providing suitable farming lands for inmates in 1886 to
isolation of dangerous and vicious patients in 1888.
The statute that established the State Asylum for Insane Criminals at
Auburn'9 was repealed2" and the various provisions of that law dealing with
insane convicts were transplanted with reference to Matteawan instead of Au-
burn as the proper place of confinement.
21
In 1896, $25,000 was appropriated from the prison capital fund "for the
erection and construction, by the use of convict labor so far as practicable, on
the state lands at Dannemora, of buildings adapted to the requirements of three
hundred insane convicts .... ,"2 2 An additional expenditure of $75,000 was au-
12. Id. at 30.
13. [1858] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 130.
14. [1886] id. ch. 192, § 1. The State Lunatic Asylum for Insane Convicts had been
renamed the "State Lunatic Asylum for Insane Criminals" by [1869] id. ch. 895, § 1, and
was renamed the "State Asylum for Insane Criminals" by 1884 id. ch. 289, § 1.
15. [1887] id. ch. 545.
16. [1887] id. ch. 545, §4.
17. [1888] id. ch. 45. This is the first statute to mention the Matteawan institution by
name. However, the mentioning of the word "Matteawan" occured only in the title to the
chapter and not in the body of the statute.
18. Id. ch. 45, § 1.
19. [1884] id. ch. 289.
20. [1893] id. ch. 81, § 15.
21. Id. ch. 81, §§ 8-10.
22. [1896] id. ch. 949, § 1.
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thorized 23 in 1897, and the buildings were to "be known as Dannemora State
Hospital for Insane Convicts." 24
In 1899, the "Dannemora hospital for insane convicts" was established "for
the purpose of confining and caring for such male prisoners as are declared in-
sane while confined in a state prison or reformatory, or while serving sentence
of more than one year in a penitentiary."25
In a letter from H.E. Allison, Medical Superintendent, answering queries
put to the Governor of New York by S.J. Barrows, the Commissioner for the
United States on the International Prison Commission, it was explained that
the construction of Dannemora would permit separation of "the habitual crim-
inals who become insane from the other class of the insane who are not properly
criminals, but whose crime is perhaps the single unlawful act of their lives, and
which is the result of insanity and not of criminal disposition or nature."1
2
Presumably, the latter class would remain at Matteawan.
B. The Significance of the Syndrome
When a mentally ill person is placed into a Department of Correction men-
tal hospital, is there a significant difference in his potential for recovery from
that illness than if he were placed into a civil state hospital within the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene? Obviously, if there is no significant difference, the
validity of any finding of an existing confusion of confinement syndrome would
be obscured by the unimportance of the problem. The greater the difference, the
greater the importance. Are we fighting the common cold, or cancer?
The most outstanding indicator of a deficiency in the potential for recovery
of patients treated in Department of Correction mental institutions is revealed
in the patient population statistics of those hospitals. Although data comparing
Department of Mental Hygiene patient flow with Department of Correction
patient flow has not been officially correlated and is not directly accessible,21
some statistics were made available by W.C. Johnston, M.D.,28 Superintendent
of Matteawan, which enable a comparison to be made.
Whereas the patient census of the civil state hospitals reached its peak in
1955 and has declined every year thereafter, 20 the Matteawan patient population
23. [1897) id. ch. 395, § 3.
24. Id. § 2.
25. [1899] id. ch. 520, § 1.
26. S.J. Barrows, supra note 2, at 44.
27. The lack of uniform data for all mental patients within the state may be evidence
of a failure of cooperation between the Department of Mental Hygiene and the Department
of Correction, to the detriment of patients. See discussion at inIra notes 219-30 and accom-
panying text.
28. Letter from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Nov. 22, 1966. As it relates
to patient population, a letter from R.E. Herold, M.D., Director of Dannemora State
Hospital to Grant H. Morris Dec. 30, 1966, stated simply:
"A few years ago our hospital population reached an all time high of 1,390. Today our
population is 448.'
29. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, State Programs for the Mentally Ill and
Mentally Retarded 4 (1965): "The peak in the number of state mental hygiene patients
occurred in June, 1955, when there were 93,550 patients."
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climbed steadily until November 1, 1962 when there was a total of 2,142
patients in the institution.3 0 While the large scale use of tranquilizing drugs,
introduced into the civil state hospitals in 1955, has been credited with the imme-
diate reversal in the rising trend in patient population,31 there was no corre-
sponding reversal for Matteawan. It may be hypothesized that either the drugs
were not made available to the Department of Correction institution in 1955,
or if available, that patients were retained in Matteawan after they were no
longer in need of institutionalization.
The decline in the patient census at Matteawan after 1962 was not related
to a breakthrough in treatment at the institution. The reduction is in large
measure attributable to the appointment of Dr. Johnston as Superintendent and
his repeated efforts to get older patients transferred into Department of Mental
Hygiene hospitals. While only 37 patients were transferred from Department
of Correction institutions to civil hospitals in 1962, 79 were transferred in 1963,
142 in 1964, and 150 in 1965, and the overwhelming number of these patients
came from Matteawan.3 2 The census at Matteawan was reduced to 1,790 pa-
tients on November 1, 1964 and to 1,642 patients on November 1, 1965.11
The United States Supreme Court decision in Baxstrom v. Herold3 4 on
February 23, 1966 led to a massive patient exodus from Matteawan and Dan-
nemora to the civil state hospitals. The administrative process involved in
moving the patients was dubbed "Operation Baxstrom"35 by the Department
of Mental Hygiene. Although the various consequences of this movement are
examined at a later point in this article, ° it should be noted here that 992
patients were transferred from Department of Correction to Department of
Mental Hygiene institutions in the six month period of March 1, 1966 to Au-
gust 31, 1966.07 Ross Herold, M.D., Director of Dannemora, reported that 425
patients were transferred from Dannemora pursuant to Operation Baxstrom.38
The Matteawan population declined from 1,523 on January 12, 1966 to 838 on
September 16, 1966,19 due largely to "Operation Baxstrom."
By contrast, the patient census of the Department of Mental Hygiene hospitals on
June 30, 1966 was 12,163 less than the 1955 peak. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene,
Monthly Statistical Report for June 1966 at 1 (1966).
30. Letter from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Nov. 22, 1966. A graph
included with the letter traced the patient census at Matteawan from 1925-1966. In 1925,
there were approximately 975 patients at Matteawan. In 1955 there were 1,950 patients-242
below the 1962 peak.
31. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, State Programs for the Mentally Ill and
Mentally Retarded 4 (1965).
32. Raw data supplied by William Goodwin, N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene.
33. Letter from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, November 22, 1966.
34. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
35. Robert C. Hunt, MD., Assistant Commissioner, N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hy-
giene, Memo. No. 4, June 24, 1966.
36. See discussion in text accompanying infra notes 131-59.
37. Letter and accompanying data from C. Stamatovich, M.D., to Grant H. Morris,
Dec. 21, 1966.
38. Letter from R. E. Herold, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Dec. 30, 1966.
39. Letter and accompanying data from W. C. Johnston, MD., to Grant H. Morris,
Nov. 22, 1966.
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The modern mental hospital is no longer viewed as a permanent custodial
institution but as a treatment center where mentally ill people are received,
treated, and discharged upon recovery. The New York State Mental Hygiene
Council reported:
For patients who do improve in the hospital there is an optimum
time when they should leave and try functioning on the outside. If
they do not leave at that time, it is increasingly difficult for them to
recover. It is believed that unduly prolonged hospitalization eventually
keeps patients sick and becomes a noxious factor rather than a helpful
ove.
40
How does the average period of confinement of patients in Department of
Correction mental institutions compare with Department of Mental Hygiene
mental institutions? The statistics released by Dr. Johnston41 show a startling
contrast between Matteawan and the civil state hospitals. Of the 1,654 patients
in Matteawan in August 1965, 796 had been confined there prior to 1958. The
average (median) stay at Matteawan was therefore between six and seven
years.4 This must be compared with the four month average length of hos-
pitalization at the Department of Mental Hygiene hospitals. 43 Even before the
introduction of the tranquilizing drugs, the average stay of patients in the civil
state hospitals in 1955 was only eight months.44 Equally alarming are the num-
bers of patients who have been subjected to inordinately prolonged confinement
at Matteawan:
1. 703 patients were incarcerated in 1955 or earlier-a minimum of 10
years;
2. 306 patients were incarcerated in 1945 or earlier-a minimum of 20
years;
3. 119 patients were incarcerated in 1935 or earlier-a minimum of 30
years;
4. 29 patients were incarcerated in 1925 or earlier-a minimum of 40
years;
5. 4 patients were incarcerated in 1915 or earlier-a minimum of 50
years.45
40. N.Y. State Mental Hygiene Council, Report on the Study of Release Procedures
for Mental Patients in New York State 8, December 7, 1954 (unpublished) (Emphasis in
original.).
41. Letter and accompanying data from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris,
Nov. 22, 1966. No similar statistics were received from Dannemora State Hospital.
42. The median of 1,654 is 827. Since 796 patients were hospitalized in Matteawan
before 1958, and 858 during or after 1958, the median confinement period lies between
1957 and 1958.
43. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, supra note 31, at 4.
44. Id.
45. Letter and accompanying data from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris,
Nov. 22, 1966.
46. Dr. Johnston's statistics classify this patient in a pre-conviction category. The
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According to the August 1965 figures, the patient longest in residence at
Matteawan was committed there in 1901-a total of 64 years.46
While civil state hospital patients are released into the community, De-
partment of Correction patients generally are not so released. Matteawan and
Dannemora patients, upon release from confinement in those institutions, are
returned to courts for trial, returned to penal institutions or are transferred to
civil state hospitals. One would expect under these circumstances that doctors
would be more willing to release patients, and that, as a consequence, patient
movement from Department of Correction mental hospitals would be more
fluid than from Department of Mental Hygiene mental hospitals; the opposite
is clearly true.
Since not all patients at Matteawan are mentally ill criminals or ex-crim-
inals,47 it is desirable to analyze the data further to determine the median length
of confinement for the specific subcategories of convicts and ex-convicts. Mat-
teawan's jurisdiction over male convicts is limited to misdemeanants and other
persons unaergoing sentences of one year or less.48 It is impossible to determine
from the 1965 data the median confinement period of this group, since at the
end of their sentences, male misdemeanants who were retained at Matteawan,
were retained in a different category-4.e., sentence-expired patients.49 In Au-
gust 1965, there were 255 patients at Matteawan whose sentences had expired.
The median period of confinement of this group was 9 years.50 To that 9 years
must be added the time spent in Matteawan prior to the expiration of their
sentences.
Fifty-four other ex-criminal patients had been transferred to Matteawan
from civil state hospitals.51 The median period of confinement of this group was
10 years.52 Is it possible that within the Correction mental institution itself,
there was discrimination between categories of patients committed to its care?
person bad been indicted of a crime, found mentally incapable of standing trial, and com-
mitted to Matteawan pursuant to the forbearer of N.Y. Corr. Law § 662-b (Supp. 1967).
47. See, e.g., N.Y. Corr. Law § 400 (Supp. 1967) gives Matteawan jurisdiction to ac-
cept as patients, persons found dangerously mentally ill under N.Y. Ment. Hygiene Law
§ 85 (Supp. 1967); persons found mentally incapable of standing trial under N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. §§ 662, 872, 873 (Supp. 1967); and persons acquitted of crimes by reason of
mental disease under N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 454 (Supp.. 1967). As to the last category of
patient, the legislature in 1967 substituted the words "mental disease or defect" for the word
"insanity." [1967J N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 681, § 58.
48. N.Y. Corr. Law § 400 (Supp. 1967).
49. [1965] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 879, § 1. It should be noted that the authority to re-
tain criminal patients after expiration of their sentences was repealed by [1966] N.Y. Sess.
Laws ch. 891, §§ 1, 5.
50. The median of 255 is 127r/. Since 127 patients in this category were hospitalized
in Matteawan in 1956 or before, and 128 in 1957 or thereafter, the median is 9 years.
51. These patients were transferred pursuant to N.Y. Corr. Law § 412. [1964] N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 105, § 11. The statute, N.Y. Corr. Law § 412, was repealed by [1965] N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 514, § 1. However the patients in Matteawan prior to the repeal of the
statute were not transferred out until "Operation Baxstrom" in 1966. See discussion in text
accompanying infra notes 131-59.
52. The median of 54 is 27. Since 27 patients in this category were hospitalized in
Matteawan in 1955 or before, and 27 in 1956 or thereafter, the median is 10 years.
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The differential in the median length of confinement between classes of pa-
tients in Matteawan may be attributable to variations in release standards ap-
plicable to those classifications. The largest single category of Matteawan
patients53 consists of persons indicted for felonies or misdemeanors who have
been found incapable of understanding the charges against them or the proceed-
ings, or of making their defenses.54 A patient so committed legally remains
in Matteawan only so long as that incapability exists 5 5-regardless of
whether he has recovered from his mental illness or whether he is dangerous."
In comparing the potential for recovery of mental patients treated in De-
partment of Mental Hygiene hospitals with those treated in Department of
Correction hospitals, it would be desirable to compare the various treatment
features of the separated systems. Unfortunately one can only theorize as to
what the prominent factors in the cure of mental illness are, and how they
should be weighted; there are no absolutes. However, noted authorities 7 have
asserted that the facilities for the treatment of mentally ill criminals 8 are in-
variably "the most unattrative, ill-equipped, and poorly-staffed division of our
state psychiatric hospitals," 59 and that close confinement of mentally ill crimi-
nals in a segregated building or unit may deprive them of opportunities for
treatment, such as psychotherapy, psychological testing, group therapy, and oc-
cupational therapy.6
In considering patients' potential for recovery, one must avoid whitewashing
the civil state hospitals. There are deficiencies in the system and in the treat-
ment offered to civilly admitted patients. For example, on June 30, 1966 civil
state hospitals were overcrowded by 6,030 patients or 8.0 per cent over the rated
53. Of the 1654 patients in Matteawan in August 1965, 820 were confined pursuant to
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 662-b(1). [1959] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 337, § 1. After "Operation
Baxstrom" had removed certain classes of patients from Matteawan, see discussion in text
accompanying infra notes 131-59, Dr. Johnston's statistics indicate that as of September 16,
1966, 565 of the 838 patients at Matteawan were confined pursuant to N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. § 662-b(1) (Supp. 1967).
54. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 662-b(1) (Supp. 1967).
55. Id. § 662-b(2).
56. It should be noted, however, that despite this easier standard of release, Dr.
Johnston's statistics of September 16, 1966 indicate that 76 of the 106 patients (71 per
cent) who had been retained at Matteawan for 20 years or longer, fall within this category
of pre-conviction patient.
57. Guttmacher, The Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 633 (1958); Weihoffen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 849 (1960).
58. While the New York approach of dividing administrative responsibility for treat-
ment of civil mental patients from criminal mental patients is not universally followed
throughout the United States, in states where this bifurcation has been attempted, the result-
ing lack of treatment afforded criminal mental patients has been severely criticized. Sea
Commonwealth of Mass., Governor's Comm. To Study the Mass. Correctional System, Second
Report 47 (1956), cited in Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?
72 Yale L.J. 853, 870 n.48 (1963); Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals n
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 78 (1961).
59. Guttmacher, supra note 57, at 645.
60. Weihoffen, supra note 57, at 860.
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capacity of 75,531. 61 There were 2,408 (6.7 per cent) employee vacancies. There
were 187 (18.2 per cent) vacancies in psychiatrist positions.6 2
For those disturbed patients who are on continued treatment wards, condi-
tions in these so-called "back wards" may be as bad as those at Matteawan and
Dannemora. But confinement in maximum security does not occur as a matter of
course in a civil state hospital. It is imposed only when a patient's condition re-
quires it. While there are degrees of security in various wards in Matteawan and
Dannemora, there are no open wards such as those that house 77,661 or 71.3 per
cent of the civil state hospital patients.63
In 1966 the New York Court of Claims awarded a claimant $115,000 as
damages for illegal confinement in Dannemora State Hospital for 24 years.
64
Judge Heller proclaimed the hospital to be "essentially a prison with facilities
for controlling psychotic convicts."165 Dannemora was found to be "an institu-
tion with few, if any, facilities for genuine treatment and rehabilitation of the
mentally ill." 66 The judge then compared treatment in a civil state hospital to
the "treatment" received by the claimant while a patient at Dannemora. What-
ever are considered to be the factors in the cure of mental illness, the judge's
statement best exemplifies the extent of the difference in the level of treatment
and potential for recovery and release available to patients treated within the
respective systems.
[T]he proof not only justifies but compels the conclusion that if
the Claimant had been transferred to a civil mental hospital upon the
expiration of his sentence or during the four year period commencing
in 1936, his chances of leading a productive and satisfactory life would
have been good. Instead, however, he was forced to spend twenty-four
more years in an institution devoted not to rehabilitation or to curing
personality disorders, but to controlling the unfortunates suffering
from them. It is precisely this orientation toward control rather than
cure which gave rise to whatever compensable damage claimant
suffered. 67
III. THE CmnoNic SYNDRomE: TE LEGAL FsArxwoRK TODAY
A. Commitment of Mentally Ill Criminals
The operative statute for commitment of mentally ill persons to Dannemora
State Hospital is New York Correction Law section 383. The statute presently
61. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, Monthly Statistical Report for June 1966 at 3
(1966).
62. Id. at 8.
63. Id. at 1. This is the June 15, 1966 figure.
64. Dennison v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 533, 267 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Ct. Cl. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 28 A.D.2d 608, 280 N.Y.S.2d 31 (3d Dep't 1967).
65. Id. at 537, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
66. Id. (Emphasis added.).
67. Id. at 538, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 925. The appellate division held that claimant's proof of
therapeutic and rehabilitative advantages of treatment at a civil mental hospital as opposed
to treatment received at Dannemora was irrelevant to the issue of liability for false imprison-
ment. Also, the court found that evidence that claimant's condition would have been cured
or substantially improved by his transfer to a civil hospital was conjectural.
659
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provides that whenever the physician or psychiatrist of any state prison, state
correctional institution, reformatory, penitentiary, or of the Eastern Correc-
tional Institution certifies to the warden that a male prisoner sentenced for a
felony is mentally ill, the warden shall apply to the judge for an examination by
two physicians. 68 If the physicians find the prisoner to be mentally ill, they are
required to make a certificate to that effect and deliver it to the warden, who
petitions the judge for an order committing the convict to Dannemora. Procedural
safeguards of notice to the prisoner and his relatives and an opportunity to de-
mand a hearing69 are mandated, though notice to relatives may be dispensed
with for sufficient reason.70 If no hearing is demanded, the judge may proceed on
the return day to determine the question of mental illness, and if satisfied that
the person is mentally ill, issue the commitment order.71 If a hearing is de-
manded, the judge hears the testimony introduced by the parties and examines
the allegedly mentally ill person, in or out of court. If he determines that the
person is mentally ill, the judge is required to issue his order forthwith, com-
mitting the individual to Dannemora State Hospital.7 2
The notice and hearing provisions are of extremely recent vintage. They
were added in 1962.73 Previously, whenever a physician or psychiatrist at a
prison certified to the warden that a male felon was, in his opinion, insane, the
warden was required to transfer the prisoner to Dannemora. The 1962 legislation
may have been occasioned by the New York Court of Appeals decision in People
ex rel. Brown v. Johnston.7 4 Brown had been convicted of rape in the first de-
gree and sentenced to "hard labor" at Attica State Prison from one day to life.
After five years he was administratively transferred to Dannemora pursuant to
Correction Law section 383. He challenged the validit of the transfer by a
writ of habeas corpus. The Appellate Division, ignoring the issue of sanity, up-
held the denial of the writ, ruling that a prisoner may not challenge the place
of his confinement by habeas corpus. The New York Court of Appeals reversed,
holding:
Although under ordinary circumstances a mere transfer (as dis-
tinguished from a commitment for insanity) is purely an administra-
tive matter, and a prisoner has no standing to choose the place in which
he is to be confined, we do not feel that the courts should sanction,
without question, removals, in cases of alleged insane prisoners, which
can conceivably be uncontrolled and arbitrary.7 5
One passage of the court's opinion should be particularly scrutinized.
68. N.Y. Corr. Law § 383(1) (Supp. 1967).
69. Id. § 383(4).
70. Id. § 383(2).
71. Id. § 383(3). This provision, authorizing commitment without a hearing when
there has been no demand for one, was held not to violate due process of law in People
ex rel. Brown v. Herold, 25 A.D.2d 455 (3d Dep't 1966).
72. Id. § 383(4).
73. [1962] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 393, § 1.
74. 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
75. Id. at 484, 174 N.E.2d at 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
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[I]t seems quite obvious that any further restraint in excess of
that permitted by the judgment or constitutional guarantees should
be subject to inquiry. An individual, once validly convicted and placed
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction (Correction
Law § 6), is not to be divested of all rights and unalterably abandoned
and forgotten by the remainder of society7 6
In indicating that confinement in Dannemora is further restraint in excess
of the prisoner's confinement at hard labor in Attica Prison, is the court merely
recognizing the right of a non-mentally ill prisoner to attack an administrative
determination of mental illness and consequent transfer to Dannemora? Can
the court's recognition that convicted criminals are not divested of all their
rights be used to question the validity of transferring prisoners into Dannemora
and Matteawan who are admittedly mentally ill?
It is arguable that confinement of mentally ill persons in Department of
Correction mental institutions is further restraint in excess of constitutional
guarantees and does in fact divest prisoners unlawfully of certain rights. A
prisoner with a toothache is adequately treated by a dentist within the prison,
and his confinement at that institution is not interrupted. However, the State of
New York has recognized that the unique nature of serious mental illness re-
quires interruption of a prisoner's confinement and transfer to a mental hospital
for treatment of that illness. Under this circumstance, is there any valid basis
for distinguishing between the treatment afforded him and the treatment afforded
to other mentally ill individuals who are hospitalized for their illness? The dis-
tinction can only be claimed as permissible due to the convict's status as a
"criminal." However, proper treatment for mental illness depends not on any
status such as "criminal," but on considerations of the diagnosis and the pathol-
ogy of the illness.
A criminal may be regarded as a person who is too dangerous to live in
society, due to his commission of an anti-social act. But when that criminal
becomes mentally ill and is transferred out of the prison for purposes of treat-
ment, the question of "dangerousness" becomes relevant only in relation to
the environment to which he is to be sent, i.e., the mental hospital, not the
community. If a man's only crime is larceny, one need not fear if he is placed
in a hospital where personal property of any intrinsic value is confiscated from
patients at time of admission. Without adequate Boy Scout training in "rubbing
sticks together," one need not fear an arsonist in a matchless place. In New
York, where a man cannot be a victim of rape, one need not fear a rapist in a
sexually segregated institution.
If it is argued that the larceny, arson, or rape is merely the manifestation
of underlying mental disease, the fallacy in the present process of criminal
justice is glaringly exposed. It is obvious that many mentally ill persons are
convicted of crimes daily. This does not imply that society must change its
76. Id. at 485, 174 N.E2d at 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46 (Emphasis in original.).
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definition of criminal responsibility. For years legal scholars have attempted
to unravel that enigma, without achieving a definitive, uniformly accepted
solution. But whichever test of criminal responsibility is utilized, the law deter-
mines that at or below some point a person's existing mental illness is irrelevant
in determining his responsibility for a crime. When a convicted criminal must
thereafter be transferred from a prison to a mental hospital, then to be consistent,
the law must consider that the mental illness that required removal from the
prison environment for the purpose of mental treatment, "developed" while he
was confined within the prison. The possible need for security safeguards to
be undertaken by the hospital is not logically dependent on a "criminal" label
that preceded the patient's mental illness.
A non-criminal who becomes sufficiently mentally ill may be committed to
a mental hospital because he also is too dangerous to live in society. Security
measures imposed on noncriminal mental patients depend upon the inability
of the patient to comprehend and respect the rights of other patients, hospital
staff, and the community, should he escape. In determining the need for security,
these considerations, which depend upon the pathology and severity of the
particular illness, are also the only rational considerations that should be ap-
plied to "criminal" mental patients as well.
To require maximum security confinement of a criminal mental patient
in a Department of Correction mental institution when it is neither needed nor
therapeutically desirable may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The
United States Supreme Court implicitly recognized the soundness of this position
in Robinson v. California." The Supreme Court held that a California statute
that made it a criminal offense to "be addicted to the use of narcotics" 78 in-
flicted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, analogized drug addiction to mental illness, stating:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would at-
tempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill. ...
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a
punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot
be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel
and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a common cold.79
Where the finding that a person is a criminal is not relevant to the need
for security during his confinement as a mental patient, confinement in a maxi-
mum security institution like Matteawan or Dannemora without a determina-
tion of the need for such security based on the considerations of the illness, is
in effect punishment for the criminal's mental illness. This cannot be constitu-
tionally condoned. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Robinson, reasoned that
77. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
78. [1957] Cal. Sess. Laws ch. 1064, § 1.
79. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
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a mentally ill person must be treated as a sick person"° and added "[w]e
would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we allowed sick-
ness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be punished for being
sick. This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action." '
It has recently been held that the Federal Civil Rights Act 82 is a proper
vehicle for a prisoner's claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment by prison authorities.8 3 The court enunciated the following principles:
1. The cruel and unusual punishment clause is applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 4
2. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 creates a cause of action for
deprivations, by persons acting under color of state law, of rights secured by
the Constitution.8 6
3. Persons confined in state prisons are within the protection of the Civil
Rights Act.87
4. The right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is one of the
rights that a state prisoner may, in a proper case, enforce under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.88
The Federal Civil Rights Act may prove a propitious route for attack on
the legality of a prisoner's confinement in Matteawan or Dannemora.89
New York Correction Law section 383 (7) provides that pending the hear-
ing for transfer of a prisoner to Dannemora, a judge may forthwith commit the
allegedly mentally ill person to Dannemora, "upon the petition and the affidavit
of two examining physicians that the warden or other officer in charge is not
able to properly care for such person at the institution where he is confined,
and that such person is in need of immediate treatment."90 While this emergency
transfer provision seems to be based on the need for "immediate treatment,"
it may be construed by harassed prison officials as a device to authorize transfer
of troublesome prisoners through an administrative determination of danger-
80. Id. at 674.
81. Id. at 678.
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (Supp. 1966).
83. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (ND. Cal. 1966).
84. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1966) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
86. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
87. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
88. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
89. In addition to the use of the Federal Civil Rights Act to challenge confinement
of convicts in Dannemora on grounds of cruel and unusual punishment, the Act may be
used to challenge confinement on equal protection grounds. See discussion at infra notes
180-94 and accompanying text.
90. N.Y. Corr. Law § 383(7) (Supp. 1967).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ousness and uncontrollability within the prison. 1 Through use of this device,
procedural safeguards could be effectively circumvented. It may be assumed
that once a prisoner has been physically transferred hundreds of miles into
Dannemora, the court that found the immediate necessity for the transfer and
ordered it, will be less than likely to find that the prisoner was not in fact,
mentally ill.92
In order for courts to authorize retention of a civil patient in a civil state
hospital, the New York MentaloHygiene Law requires a two-part determination
that "the patient is mentally ill and in need of retention for care and treatment.
. .. 9 Thus the State of New York accepts the premise that a person may be
mentally ill but not necessarily in need of treatment in a mental institution.
For transfer into Dannemora, Correction Law section 383 requires only a one-
part deteimination that the prisoner is mentally ill. Ironically, the only mention
of the word "treatment" in the statute is in the emergency transfer provision,
section 383 (7). Quaere: Should not a prisoner's need for treatment be a factor to
be considered in non-emergency transfers to Dannemora?
New York Correction Law section 408 is the Matteawan counterpart to
Dannemora's section 383 and the procedure for transfer of "mentally ill prison-
ers" 94 into Matteawan is identical. The criticisms of the Dannemora procedure
are equally applicable to Matteawan. Pursuant to section 408 persons under-
going sentences of one year or less or convicted of misdemeanors, persons adjudi-
cated youthful offenders, wayward minors, or juvenile delinquents, and any
female prisoner may be committed to Matteawan if they become mentally ill
while serving their sentences in the state prison for women, any county peniten-
tiary, jail, or workhouse, any reformatory for women or a state reformatory,
or any other correctional institution.
The New York Family Court Act specifically mandates:
"No adjudication under this article may be denominated a conviction, and
no person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent.., shall be denominated a criminal
by reason of such adjudication." 95
Similarly, an adjudication that a person is a wayward minor or a youthful
offender does not denominate the person a "criminal" nor is the determination
deemed a conviction.98 Nevertheless, section 408 refers to a petition "for an
order committing such convict to the Matteawan state hospital." 97
91. For example, Abraham L. Halpern, M.D., Onondaga County Comm'r of Mental
Health, commented to this writer in July 1966 that, "Invariably, prisoners who go on hunger
strikes end up in Dannemora."
92. Abraham L. Halpern, M.D., Onondaga County Comm'r of Mental Health, com-
mented to this writer in July 1966 that, "Once a prisoner has been transferred into Danne-
mora, courts regard him as a different person."
93. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 72(3) (Supp. 1967).
94. N.Y. Corr. Law § 408 (Supp. 1967).
95. N.Y. Family Court Act § 781 (Supp. 1967).
96. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 913-dd (wayward minors), 913-n (youthful offenders)
(Supp. 1967).
97. N.Y. Corr. Law § 408(2) (Supp. 1967) (Emphasis added.).
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B. Commitment of Mentally Ill Ex-Criminals
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court examined a New York statute
authorizing commitment of mentally ill ex-criminals to Department of Correc-
tion mental institutions. The decision of the Supreme Court in Baxstrom v.
Herold"8 is important, not merely for the Court's espousal of a new
principle, but also for the conclusions that can be reached concerning adminis-
trative reactions required by the opinion. The decision, virtually unnoticed
by legal scholars,99 is like a stone thrown into a tranquil sea. The ripples
created by Baxstrom's splash should activate a necessary reexamination of
the legality and desirability of the confinement of every class of patient at
Matteawan and Dannemora.
1. New York Correction Law Section 384
Johnnie K. Baxstrom was convicted of assault, second degree, on April 23,
1959, and sentenced to a term of two and one-half to three years in Attica
State Prison. He was transferred to Dannemora on July 1, 1961, pursuant to
New York Correction Law section 383. Since the full term of Baxstrom's sen-
tence was due to expire on December 18, 1961, New York Correction Law sec-
tion 384 became operative. That section, as it applied to Baxstrom in 1961,
provided in part:
1. Within thirty days prior to the expiration of the term of a
prisoner confined in the Dannemora state hospital, when in the opinion
of the director' 00 such prisoner continues insane, the director shall ap-
ply to a judge of a court of record for the certification of a person not
in confinement on a criminal charge. The court in which such proceed-
ings are instituted shall, if satisfied that such person may require care
and treatment in an institution for the mentally ill, issue an order
directing that such person be committed to the custody of the commis-
sioner of mental hygiene to be placed in an appropriate state institu-
tion of the department of mental hygiene or of the department of cor-
rection as may be designated for the custody of such person by agree-
ment between the heads of the two departments.'
The phrase authorizing commitment to the custody of the Commissioner
of Mental Hygiene upon expiration of sentence and for designation and place-
ment of the person "in an appropriate state institution" within either Depart-
ment first appeared in section 384 in a 1961 amendment of that section'0 2 and
98. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
99. But see Comment, Equal Protection & Commitment of the Insane in Wisconsin,
50 Marq. L. Rev. 120 (1966).
100. It is interesting to note that there is no "director" of Dannemora. N.Y. Corr.
Law § 377 (Supp. 1967) refers to the appointment of a "superintendent for the Dannemora
state hospital" and this language has continued unchanged, even though § 377 has been
amended as recently as 1964. [1964] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 105, § 4.Quaere: Could it have been argued that there was no "director" to petition for certifi-
cation pursuant to N.Y. Corr. Law § 384?
101. [1961] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 429, § 1.
102. Id. (eff. April 11, 1961).
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remained virtually unchanged by subsequent amendments to that statute. Prior
to 1961, the "director" of Dannemora applied to a court for an order authorizing
continued retention of the patient at Dannemora.
Commitment pursuant to section 384 was deemed to be a civil commit-
ment.
o0 3
On December 6, 1961, in accordance with section 384, Baxstrom was com-
mitted to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, who designated
Dannemora as the appropriate state institution for the continued confinement
of the patient.
Chief Justice Warren, writing the opinion for eight members of the
Court, held that Baxstrom had been denied equal protection of the laws in
contravention of the fourteenth amendment. The section 384 procedure, under
which he was civilly committed, denied him the possibility of a jury review of
the determination of mental illness which was available to all other persons
civilly committed in New York. 10 4 Also, section 384, in authorizing his civil
commitment to an institution maintained by the Department of Correction
through the decision of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, deprived him of
a judicial hearing to determine whether he was dangerously mentally ill, as
afforded to all other civil patients transferred into those institutions' 0 5
Baxstrom's counsel argued that all inmates of Dannemora, whether serving
a sentence or not, are subject to prison discipline. Social amenities granted
patients in civil hospitals were denied to Baxstrom-he could not correspond
freely with friends and persons not approved by the Commissioner of Correc-
tion; his visitors were fingerprinted; and his prison number given him upon
his transfer into Dannemora, remained his number after his sentence expired
and was required to appear on all his correspondence as a "civil" patient.100
The Supreme Court did not make any factual determination regarding the
nature of Dannemora, i.e., whether treatment at Dannemora is substantially
similar to civil state hospitals. The Court reasoned that the New York State
Legislature had made a significant determination by placing Dannemora within
the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction and the civil mental hospitals
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Hygiene: "While we may
assume that transfer among like mental hospitals is a purely administrative
function, where, as here, the State has created functionally distinct institu-
tions, classification of patients for involuntary commitment to one of these insti-
tutions may not be wholly arbitrary.' 1.0 7
Are Department of Correction mental institutions really "functionally dis-
tinct"? If their function is to confine mentally ill criminals 08 regardless of
103. N.Y. Corr. Law § 384(1); [1965] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 540, § 4.
104. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 74 (Supp. 1967), as renumbered and amended,
[1964] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 738, § 6.
105. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law §§ 85, 135 (Supp. 1967).
106. Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
107. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 (1966).
108. N.Y. Corr. Law §§ 383, 408 (Supp. 1967).
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whether they are dangerously mentally ill, then the constitutionality of the
statute authorizing transfers of civil patients into Matteawan, 10 9 is question-
able. Additionally, the confinement of persons who have been found mentally
incapable of standing trial,"l0 or not guilty of crimes by reason of insanity,"'
or adjudicated juvenile delinquents," 2 in a Department of Correction mental
institution is of doubtful constitutional validity since these patients are not
convicted criminals.
If the function of Department of Correction mental institutions is to con-
fine dangerous mental patients, then statutes committing to those institutions
criminals, persons incapable of standing trial, persons not guilty of crimes by
reason of insanity, and juvenile delinquents-without any determinatiofi of
dangerous mental illness-are constitutionally objectionable. A critical stage has
been reached in society's confusion of confinement.
While it may be argued that Dannemora may serve one functional purpose,
e.g., retention of mentally ill criminals, and Matteawan the other purpose, e.g.,
retention of the dangerously mentally ill, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected
this distinction. After Baxstrom's sentence had expired, he was confined in
Dannemora. The Court determined that he, as a civil patient, was entitled to
a hearing pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law section 85 before he
could be retained in a Department of Correction mental institution. However,
a section 85 determination of dangerous mental illness authorizes transfer of
civil hospital patients to Matteawan exclusively. The Court did not suggest that
if Baxstrom had been given the section 85 hearing that he could not have been
retained at Dannemora. The Court did not distinguish between the two Depart-
ment of Correction mental hospitals, but rather, between those institutions as
a unit and the civil state hospitals.
2. New York Correction Law Section 412
Pursuant to section 412, the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene"i3 could
administratively transfer, from civil state hospitals to Matteawan, patients in
the following categories:
1. any patient who was held in a civil hospital under any other than a
a civil process;
2. any patient who had been previously sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment in any correctional institution and who still manifested criminal tendencies;
and
3. any "such" patient who had previously been an inmate of Matteawan.
109. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 85 (Supp. 1967).
110. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 662-b, 872 (Supp. 1967).
111. Id. § 454.
112. That the effect 6f such an adjudication is not a criminal conviction, see N.Y.
Family Court Act § 781 (Supp. 1967).
113. Pursuant to [1963] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 147, § 1, the consent of the Commissioner
of Correction was also required for the transfer.
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The word "such" as used in section 412, demonstrates the unconcerned and
confusing manner in which laws are drafted that affect so vitally the lives of
mentally ill criminals and ex-criminals. If "such" refers to those patients who
had also been previously sentenced and who still manifested criminal tendencies,
then there was no need for the third category at all, since all persons in it would
necessarily be included in the second category.
It is arguable, and perhaps probable, that the statutory language meant
that persons in the third category need merely have been sentenced to a term
of imprisonment in a correctional institution and have been a patient at Mattea-
wan-without any inquiry as to whether he still manifested "criminal tenden-
des." If this is a proper interpretation, then quaere: For a person to fit within
the third category, did his confinement at Matteawan have to occur during the
term of imprisonment, 14 or could it have been separate from that sentence? 16
Another interpretation of "such" would be to read it as a nullity so that
pursuant to section 412 any patient who previously had been in Matteawan
could be transferred there from a civil state hospital without any showing
that the patient had ever been sentenced to a term of imprisonment or that
he still manifested criminal tendencies. This absurd interpretation has been re-
jected by at least one court."16
Within this decade, section 412 has come under close judicial scrutiny. In
1934, John J. Carroll was convicted of robbery in New York, and served his
sentence in prison, being discharged in 1938. On January 7, 1949 Carroll was
committed as a civil patient to a civil state hospital. In escaping from that in-
stitution, he allegedly assaulted a hospital attendant. Without a hearing, the
Commissioner of Mental Hygiene ordered Carroll's transfer to Matteawan pur-
suant to section 412 as a "patient who has previously been sentenced to a term
of imprisonment in any correctional institution, and who still manifests criminal
tendencies."
On a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit"1 7 held section 412 unconstitutional and ordered Carroll returned
to the civil state hospital. The court found
114. As, for example, where the patient became mentally ill while serving a sentence
for a misdemeanor and is transferred to Matteawan pursuant to N.Y. Corr. Law § 408
(Supp. 1967).
115. As, for example, where the patient was in a civil state hospital and transferred
to Matteawan as dangerous, pursuant to N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 85 (Supp. 1967)
prior to or subsequent to a criminal sentence; or where the person was found incapable
of standing trial and sent to Matteawan pursuant to N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 662-b
(Supp. 1967) before he was tried, found guilty, and served his sentence in a prison.
116. Gomillion v. Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, 29 Misc. 2d 729, 218 N.Y.S.2d
685 (Sup. Ct. 1961). The petitioner had been an inmate of Matteawan prior to September
14, 1949. On March 26, 1954, he was transferred from a civil state hospital pursuant to
N.Y. Corr. Law § 412 as a patient who had previously been an inmate of Matteawan.
The court vacated the transfer order and remanded the petitioner to the civil state hospital.
117. United States ex rel. Carroll v. McNeill, 294 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted,
368 U.S. 951, dismissed as moot, 369 U.S. 149 (1962).
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nothing to demonstrate that ex-convicts, who after expiration of their
sentences, become mentally ill, are inherently more dangerous than
those mentally ill who are not ex-convicts. In fact there are many
"criminal tendencies" that are in no way violent tendencies just as
there are many convicts and ex-convicts whose crimes were non-violent
crimes.118
While administrative transfer of a civil patient between civil state hospitals
was permissible, section 85 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law mandated a
judicial hearing to transfer a civil patient to Matteawan. It therefore violated
equal protection of the laws to deny that hearing arbitrarily to section 412
patients.110
Certiorari in the Carroll case was granted by the Supreme Court,1 20 but
upon Carroll's death, the appeal was dismissed as moot. 2 1
The following year, a lower New York court upheld the constitutionality
of section 412.122 The court found that the Carroll case was not stare decisis
and rejected the rationale of that case. In a fact situation similar to Carroll,
the court reasoned:
The only objection that could be raised by the relator is that he
may be more restricted at Matteawan, might enjoy fewer privileges and
would at Matteawan be confined with dangerous persons who are liable
to harm or adversely affect him. This objection, however, is not in the
court's opinion sufficient to declare the statute providing for this ad-
ministrative transfer to be unconstitutional.
It is for the Legislature to determine the mechanics and proceed-
ings for such transfer provided, of course, there is not a deprivation of
the rights of the individual and it is for the court to construe the stat-
ute, if possible, to avoid the conclusion that it is unconstitutional. 23
In another section 412 case, an appellate court agreed with the principle
of the Carroll case, and even rendered the opinion that the denial of a pre-
transfer hearing to section 412 patients may be violative of due process as well
as equal protection of the laws.124 However, the court felt constrained to affirm
the dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus on the authority of an earlier New
York Court of Appeals decision. 125 That earlier case, which appears in the
memoranda of the Court of Appeals, was prepared by the state reporter from
appeal papers, and was handed down without opinion. According to the re-
porter of the case, the court stated that "relator's contention as to the statute's
(section 412) unconstitutionality presented little merit .... ,126
118. Id. at 123.
119. Id. at 121.
120. 368 U.S. 951 (1962).
121. 369 U.S. 149 (1962).
122. People ex rel. Brown v. McNeill, 35 Misc. 2d 53, 230 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
123. Id. at 57, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
124. People ex reZ. Aronson v. McNeill, 19' A.D.2d 731, 732, 242 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429
(2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 1043, 195 N.E.2d 316, 245 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1963).
125. People ex rel. Monaco v. McNeil, 299 N.Y. 605, 86 N.E.2d 17,6 (1949).
126. Id. at 606.
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In 1965, the New York Legislature ended further judicial disagreement by
repealing section 412.12 The bill to repeal the statute was recommended by the
Department of Mental Hygiene and introduced at its request. The Department's
memorandum of justification for the legislation stated:
It is our opinion that Section 85 affords the Department adequate
protection in the case of the dangerously mentally ill and the Commis-
sioner of Mental Hygiene has adopted a policy of not exercising the
discretion given to him by the provisions of Section 412. Cases which
might fall within Section 412 will be handled for transfer under Section
85.128
There were 54 patients who had been transferred into Matteawan pursuant
to section 412 and who remained there prior to the repeal of that statute.1
20
They were not immediately retransferred to the civil hospitals nor were they
afforded a section 85 hearing which the Department of Mental Hygiene con-
sidered to be a "simple and fair procedure for transfer of dangerously mentally
ill persons. . .. ,,130 It remained for the Baxstrom decision to require the physical
removal of section 412 patients from Matteawan. In Baxstrom, the Supreme
Court, alluding to section 412, rejected the state's contention that persons in
Baxstrom's class-i.e., sentence-expired criminals-could be reasonably classified
as dangerously mentally ill as shown by their past criminal records.
C. Operation Baxstrom-The Administrative Response
The Baxstrom decision did not result in the immediate discharge of a single
patient from Dannemora directly into society. Rather, the Department of Mental
Hygiene "transferred" to civil state hospitals all ex-prisoners whose sentences
had expired and who were being held at Dannemora pursuant to the uncon-
stitutional section 384. This process was denominated "Operation Baxstrom."r 1e
In order to accomplish this "transfer" it was necessary to have these patients
admitted as involuntary civil patients pursuant to section 72 of the New York
Mental Hygiene Law. The Superintendent of Dannemora, Dr. Herold, petitioned
for the admission of each patient to a civil state hospital, stating that in his
opinion "this man is mentally ill and requires further care and treatment in a
127. [1965] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 524, § 1.
128. E. D. Wiley, Review of Mental Hygiene and Related Legislation for the Year
1965 at 13 (1965).
129. Letter and accompanying data from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris,
Nov. 22, 1966. Dr. Johnston's statistics for August 1965, a month after the effective date
of the repeal of section 412 (June 28, 1965), reveal that 54 patients were confined in Mat-
teawan on a section 412 status. One of those patients had been confined on that status
since 1921-a total of 44 years.
130. E. D. Wiley, supra note 128, at 13.
131. Johnnie K. Baxstrom was transferred to Marcy State Hospital pursuant to
"Operation Baxstrom." He requested a review and a rehearing of the order of retention,
and a jury found him not mentally ill. The New York Supreme Court, County of Oneida,
Judge Mead presiding, ordered his release and discharge on May 24, 1966. The Utica
Observer Dispatch, June 8, 1966, at 25, reported that Baxstrom died of an epileptic seizure
on June 7, 1966.
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civil state mental institution." He is permitted to be such a petitioner under an
assumed fiction of section 72, i.e., that the director of Dannemora is a "person
with whom the person alleged to be mentally ill may reside or at whose house
he may be." 13 2 The statute requires the examination of two physicians for
admission of a patient to a civil state hospital.133 Physicians on the staff of
Dannemora State Hospital were utilized for these examinations. While the
transfer of 425 patients from Dannemora is directly attributable to the uncon-
stitutionality of section 384,L3 additional classes of patients at Matteawan, who
were similarly situated, were also transferred.135 A total of 992 patients were
chopped from the rolls of Dannemora and Matteawan by the Baxstrom axe.136
How did the "Operation Baxstrom" patients fare upon transfer into the
civil state hospitals? In analyzing the data reluctantly released' 87 by the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene, it must be remembered that the patients transferred
into the civil state hospitals were all patients that the Department of Mental
Hygiene had administratively determined to be too dangerously mentally ill
to be in civil hospitals. Although the Supreme Court in Baxstrom ruled that
procedurally judicial hearings were necessary for the confinement of dangerous
civil patients in Department of Correction institutions, supposedly the experts,
the psychiatrists in the Department of Mental Hygiene, had administratively
designated Dannemora and Matteawan as the "appropriate institution" 138 only
after a determination that the patient to be retained there was in fact danger-
ously mentally ill.
The results are astounding. More than any other factor, the "Operation
Baxstrom" statistics illuminate the glaring deficiencies of treatment in Depart-
132. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 72(1) (Supp. 1967). A "friend--meaning one ac-
quainted with the person-may also petition for civil admission pursuant to the section.
133. Id.
134. Letter from R. E. Herold, MD., to Grant H. Morris, Dec. 30, 1966.
135. See e.g., [1965] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 879, § 1; N.Y. Corr. Law § 412, repealed by
[1965] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 524, § 1.
136. Letter and accompanying data from C. Stamatovich, M.D., to Grant H. Morris,
Dec. 21, 1966.
137. Id. The letter began:
Merry Christmas !
After checking with Mr. Weinstein [Statistics] the decision is that you may
have this information-if you promise to let us see how you intend to use it
[censoring?]
However, it should be noted that "Operation Baxstrom" information may become
available to the public. In a letter from Robert C. Hunt, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Nov.
20, 1966, Dr. Hunt, formerly in charge of "Operation Baxstrom," wrote:
Dave Wiley and I as co-authors have submitted a paper on the Baxstrom
experience to the program committee of the American Psychiatric Association. If
they accept it, we will make additional studies, write the paper, read it at the an-
nual meeting next May, and submit it for publication in the American Journal of
Psychiatry.
138. See e.g., [1965] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 540, § 4 (Dannemora). Ironically, [1965]
N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 879, § 1 authorized retention at Matteawan of prisoners upon expria-
tion of their term of imprisonment without even an administrative determination of danger-
ous mental illness. However, the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene was authorized to transfer
sentence-expired civil patients to civil state hospitals and presumably would have done
so if in fact they were not dangerous.
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ment of Correction mental institutions. Unfortunately, they also demonstrate
the lack of concern of the Department of Mental Hygiene for these mental
patients prior to the Baxstrom decision.
The Department of Mental Hygiene compiled data for a three month period
(March, 1966-May, 1966) 139 and a six month period (March 1, 1966-August
31, 1966). 140
The three month statistics list 865 patients admitted to civil state hospitals
pursuant to "Operation Baxstrom." Within the three month period, 173 patients
were retained as "voluntary" patients. A voluntary patient is one who may dis-
charge himself from the hospital by giving 10 days written notice of his intention
or desire to leave.141 There had been a change to the legal status of "informal"
patient in an additional 18 cases. An informal patient is one who is free to
leave the hospital at any time.142 A total of 182 patients had freedom of the
grounds. While 25 patients were discharged within the period, only 4 of the
865 were retransferred to Matteawan as dangerously mentally ill pursuant to
the "simple procedure"'143 of section 85 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law.
Thus the statistics significantly reveal that six times the number of patients
were released absolutely to the community in the first three months of "Opera-
tion Baxstrom" than were returned to Department of Correction confinement
as dangerously mentally ill. Even more startling is the fact that within the
initial period, less than one half of one per cent of the patients were found to
be so dangerously mentally ill that they required retransfer to Matteawan-
even though prior to "Operation Baxstrom," they supposedly were all danger-
ous. The Baxstrom patients were actually purer than Ivory Soap; they were
99 5 'Yoo per cent free from dangerous mental illnessl
The six month statistics continue, and in fact, emphasize, the trend. The
increase in Baxstrom patients from 865 to 992 was largely attributable to the
statute, effective July 1, 1966, which gave Matteawan and Dannemora patients
time off their sentences for good behavior. 144 Between 75 and 100 patients were
139. Robert C. Hunt, M.D., Asst. Comm'r N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, Memo.
No. 4, June 24, 1966.
140. "Report on Baxstrom Cases for Period of March 1, 1966 to Aug. 31, 1966" in
letter and accompanying data from C. Stamatovich, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Dec. 21,
1966.
141. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 71(1) (Supp. 1967). Note however, that a proceeding
to convert the patient to an involuntary status may be undertaken during the 10 day notice
period.
142. Id. § 71(2).
143. E. D. Wiley, supra note 128, at 13.
144. [1966] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 652, § 1. Prior to July 1, 1966, time served in confine-
ment in an institution other than a state prison or penitentiary was not calculated in re-
duction of prisoners' sentences. This nonallowance of good time for confinement in a
Department of Correction mental institution was regarded as punishment by prisoners,
for it "extended" their sentences to the maximum.
18 U.S.C. § 4241 (Supp. 1966) is the presently existing statute denying good time
allowance to federal prisoners transferred into mental institutions. A predecessor of that
statute was upheld against constitutional attack as an ex post facto statute in Kuczynski
v. United States, 145 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1944); Estabrook v. King, 119 F.2d 607 (8th Cir.
1941); Douglas v. King, 110 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1940).
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transferred as the immediate effect of that statute. 45 In the future, the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene anticipates that it will receive about 60 patients
a year from Matteawan and Dannemora as patients' sentences expire.146
Of the 992 Baxstrom patients reported, 273 had been converted into a
voluntary status and 24 became informal patients. Twenty-two were condition-
ally released from the hospital on convalescent care 47 and an additional 42
had left the hospital on other statuses.148
For the full six month period 79 patients were discharged while only 6 of
the 992 were retransferred to Matteawan as dangerously mentally ill. Thus
13 times the number of Baxstrom patients were unconditionally released to the
community than found their way back to Department of Correction mental
confinement. A miniscule six-tenths of one per cent of the Baxstrom patients were
actually too dangerous to be treated in civil state hospitals.
Almost three months later, November 22, 1966, Dr. Johnston reported
that no additional "Operation Baxstrom" patients were retransferred to
Matteawan as dangerously mentally ill. 49 This was the situation exactly nine
months after the Baxstrom decision.
The conclusions one reaches from "Operation Baxstrom" are inescapable. 5 0
The Department of Mental Hygiene had the facilities to handle over 99 per
cent of the patients that it considered dangerously mentally ill. When these
ex-criminal patients were integrated with other civil patients and given treat-
ment indistinguishable from that afforded other civil patients, they responded
readily.' 5' Furthermore, it is obvious that large numbers of Baxstrom patients
labeled dangerously mentally ill and confined in Department of Correction men-
tal institutions, were not, in fact, dangerous.
The lack of perception, illustrated in the attitude of the Department of
Mental Hygiene toward ex-criminals prior to the Baxstrom decision, is also re-
flected in the Department's attitude toward retransfer of civil patients from
145. Robert C. Hunt, M.D., Asst. Comm'r N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, Memo.
No. 5, July 22, 1966.
146. Id.
147. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 87(1)(d) (Supp. 1967).
148. The 42 patients were listed as being in the following categories: family care,
escape, leave without consent, and leave.
149. Letter from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Nov. 22, 1966.
A letter from Dr. Johnston to Grant H. Morris, May 21, 1968, contained the following
statement: "No more than ten Baxstrom cases have been returned to Matteawan as dan-
gerously mentally ill."
150. It is the opinion of this writer that the conclusions are inescapable, notwithstand-
ing Dr. Stamatovich's statement regarding "Operation Baxstrom":
Anyway, I think it is a bit premature to make any comments. We haven't had
any major trouble-yet, but lets wait, say two years or so.
Letter from C. Stamatovich, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Dec. 21, 1966.
151. Although all "Operation Baxstrom" patients were transferred into the civil hospitals
as involuntary patients, 36% of the patients remaining in the civil hospitals on August 31,
1966, were retained on a voluntary or informal status. This compares favorably with the
39% of civil patients generally that were admitted from the community in June 1966 on
these non-compulsory statuses. N.Y. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, Monthly Statistical
Report for June 1966 at 3 (1966).
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Matteawan who are no longer dangerously mentally ill. A person transferred
to Matteawan pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law section 85 was required to
be retained there until he was "no longer dangerous to safety whereupon he
may be released as provided in the correction law or he may be transferred
to any hospital in the department (of Mental Hygiene) upon the order of the
commissioner (of Mental Hygiene) .1152 Prior to 1965, there was no specific
statute in the Correction Law for the release of non-prisoner patients. At that
time, the Matteawan discharge statute, section 409 of the New York Correction
Law, dealt only with release of mentally ill prisoners at the expiration of their
sentences. Also, Dr. Johnston was concerned that the Department of Mental
Hygiene, which had the duty to retransfer to civil hospitals those patients who
were no longer dangerous, simply refused to do so.15 3 Section 409 was amended
in 1965 to authorize the director of Matteawan to release non-prisoner 3 4 pa-
tients who had recovered, or who, if still mentally ill, were reasonably safe to
be at large. Thus Dr. Johnston was given a wedge, since if the Department of
Mental Hygiene refused to retransfer a patient, the patient could be released
from Matteawan even though he was still mentally ill. This wedge was not
used, however.
In 1966, New York Mental Hygiene Law section 85 was amended to limit
to six months the original period of detention in Matteawan of persons trans-
ferred as dangerously mentally ill. Thereafter the director of Matteawan could
apply for further periods of detention. 15 Of the 210 section 85 patients in
Matteawan, Dr. Johnston chose to request orders of retention for only 74.150
The other 136 patients were transferred' 57 virtually en masse to the Department
of Mental Hygiene. Unless overnight 136 dangerous mental patients were
miraculously cured of their dangerousness, it may be safely assumed that
62 per cent of the patients confined in Matteawan pursuant to section 85 were
not, in fact, dangerous. It is equally apparent that the Department of Mental
Hygiene has not learned the lessons taught by "Operation Baxstrom." Dr. John-
ston reported:
The directors of the civil hospitals are resisting the return of
many of these Section 85 cases that we are unwilling to still label as
152. [1963] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 704, § 2.
153. In a conference at Matteawan State Hospital, March 18, 1965, Dr. W. C. Johnston
stated that the Department of Mental Hygiene refused to accept patients from Matteawan
in the age bracket of 18 to 45, and consequently "[s]ection 85 is the kiss of death."
154. The word "non-prisoner" as used in the amended section 409 meant certain
non-sentence serving patients including those transferred into Matteawan as dangerously
mentally ill pursuant to N. Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 85 (Supp. 1967).
155. [1966] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 891, §§ 2, 3. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 89(4-a)
(Supp. 1967) authorizes the director of Matteawan to apply initially for a 6 month period
of retention, the next for up to one year, and subsequent applications for up to two years.
The periods of retention correspond to those for patients in civil hospitals, pursuant to Id.
§ 73.
156. Letter from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Nov. 22, 1966; Letter
from C. Stamatovich, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Jan. 25, 1967.
157. Letter from C. Stamatovich, MD., to Grant H. Morris, Jan. 25, 1967.
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being dangerously mentally ill. In a meeting yesterday in Albany Dr.
Terrence 58 stressed the number of telephone calls that he had received
from many hospitals objecting to the return of the dangerously men-
tally ill patients.159
D. The Legislative Reaction-Rejection of Baxstrom v. Herold
As an aftermath of the Baxstrom decision, the New York Legislature
hastily enacted chapter 891 of the Laws of 1966. The statute, in addition to
repealing the unconstitutional section 384 of the New York Correction Law,
repealed and amended various other laws relating to commitment of various
classes of mentally ill persons.
That the Newtonian principle-for every action there is an equal and
opposite reaction-had its legal counterpart, was illustrated by the amend-
ment of New York Correction Law section 385 embodied in chapter 891.160 It
is submitted that section 385 was amended as a direct and negative reaction to
the Baxstrom decision, and that, as amended, the statute is subject to grave
constitutional doubt.
Prior to 1966, section 385 innocuously permitted the director of Danne-
mora to discharge at the expiration of their sentences, those prisoners who had
not been committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene
and who, though still mentally ill, were, in his opinion, reasonably safe to be
at large."6 This power remains unchanged. However, the 1966 amendment
added:
Every prisoner in Dannemora state hospital whose sentence has
expired or who is otherwise entitled to release shall be dealt with as
hereinafter provided. Whenever any prisoner in Dannemora state
hospital shall continue to be mentally ill the director of such hospital
may apply for his admission to a hospital for the care and treatment
of the mentally ill as provided in the mental hygiene law. The director
may if it is his opinion that any such prisoner is so dangerously men-
tally ill that his presence in a hospital in the department of mental
hygiene would be dangerous to the safety of the other patients therein,
the officers or employees thereof, or the community, make applica-
tion to a court as provided in section eighty-five of the mental hygiene
law and the provisions of such section shall govern such proceedings
before such court.16 2
Admittedly, the statute mandates the same procedural notice and hearing
for transfer of ex-criminal patients from Dannemora to Matteawan as is pres-
ently available to patients in civil hospitals prior to their transfer to Matteawan
as dangerously mentally ill.163 On the surface, the Baxstrom objection to ad-
158. Christopher F. Terrence, M.D., is the First Deputy Comm'r of the N.Y. Dep't
of Mental Hygiene.
159. Letter from W. C. Johnston, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Nov. 22, 1966.
160. [19661 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 891, § 4.
161. E1964] id. ch. 105, § 6.
162. [1966] id. ch. 891, § 4.
163. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 85 (Supp. 1967).
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ministrative transfer of ex-criminal patients, seems to be met. With a minimum
of sophistication, however, it can be seen that "the cure is worse than the
disease."
In 1964, the New York Legislature drastically revised the procedure for
admission of patients to civil hospitals.16 4 Mental Hygiene Law section 85 was
not revised at that time' 65 because it is not an admissions statute; it is a
transfer statute. Through the 1966 amendment, however, section 85 is utilized
as an admissions statute for one class of civil patient, i.e., the sentence-expired
patient in a Department of Correction mental institution. For the first time,
certain civil patients may be admitted directly to a Department of Correction
mental institution.
Under the guise of offering procedural safeguards, the very basis of the
section 85 hearing is undermined. All other civil patients are admitted to civil
hospitals and only if it is demonstrated that they are so dangerously mentally
ill that their presence at that hospital would constitute a danger, may they be
transferred to Matteawan. Proof of that dangerous mental illness has always
been grounded on acts or tendencies exhibited while the person was a patient
in the civil hospital. In fact, the original enactment was "inspired by the slaying
of a patient in one of the state hospitals by another patient .... ,110 Prior to
the legislation, to secure the patient's transfer to Matteawan, he was indicted
of the crime-which he was incapable of committing-and found insane and
unable to stand trial.167 This 1932 enactment sought to remedy this "fiction." 108
Since ex-criminals who have been confined at Dannemora have never been
in a civil mental hospital, under the amended section 385, proof of mental illness
sufficient to be dangerous to a civil hospital, can be based only on acts committed
while they were serving sentences as criminals in a Correction institution or a
Correction mental institution. Therefore, admission to Matteawan is authorized
for this one class of civil patient without their exhibiting dangerous mental
illness in a civil state hospital. All other civil patients-persons in the same
class-must first exhibit dangerousness in a civil institution, before section 85
may be used against them.
164. [1964] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 738.
165. Only the title to § 85 was amended, to conform it to modern terminology in the
rest of the N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law. The word "commitment" was changed to "certifica-
tion" and the words "insane inmates" were changed to 'mentally ill patients." [1964] N.Y.
Sess. Laws ch. 738, § 2.
166. Letter from Walter N. Thayer, Jr., Comm'r of Correction, to Hon. Samuel I.
Rosenman, Counsel to the Governor, March 19, 1932, on file in the bill jacket of Senate
Intro. No. 1608, Pr. No. 1978, N.Y. Leg. 1932, in the N.Y. State Dep't of Educ. Legis. Ref.
Library.
167. Letter from Frederick W. Parsons, M.D., Comm'r of Mental Hygiene, to Hon.
Samuel I. Rosenman, Counsel to the Governor, March 18, 1932, and letter from Charles
B. Sears, P.J., Sup. Ct. App. Div., Fourth Dep't, to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Governor
of the State of New York, March 22, 1932. Both letters are on file in the bill jacket of
Senate Intro. No. 1608, Pr. No. 1978, N.Y. Leg. 1932, in the N.Y. State Dep't of Educ.
Legis. Ref. Library.
168. Letter from Charles B. Sears to Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 167.
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It may be argued that the wording of section 85 does not specifically require
proof of dangerous mental illness from acts committed at civil hospitals, and that
acts committed by patients before they were admitted to civil hospitals may be
utilized in the determination. This strict construction is not supported by ad-
ministrative enforcement of the statute. Proof of dangerousness at the civil
institution has always been indispensable. To negate that requirement and use
acts of ex-criminal civil patients under other circumstances would be an out-
rage to the equal protection principle expressed in the venerable Yick Wo v.
Hopkins.169
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
of the Constitution.170
Baxstrom is authority for the proposition that ex-criminals are similarly
situated with other civil persons. Equal protection argument aside, if ex-criminals
may be admitted directly to Department of Correction mental institutions,
then arguably, other persons could, if a statute was enacted, be admitted directly
from the community to a Department of Correction mental institution on a
showing of dangerous mental illness. If such a statute would be repugnant to
due process, then a fortiori, section 385, as it exists today, is similarly offensive.
As a practical matter, the nine month results of "Operation Baxstrom"
conclusively demonstrate the fallacy of relying on acts of patients confined at
Dannemora as a basis for a determination of dangerousness in a civil hospital.
Of the 992 ex-criminal patients who were retained in Department of Correction
mental institutions as dangerous and transferred to civil state hospitals by
"Operation Baxstrom," 986 have not been sufficiently dangerous in the civil
hospitals to require retransfer to Matteawan pursuant to section 85. If Baxstrom
had not forced their transfer, it is difficult to believe that a significant portion
of these patients, if any, would have found their way into the civil hospitals
within this nine month period. By permitting retention of a sentence-expired
patient in a Department of Correction mental institution on evidence of danger-
ous mental illness while he served his sentence, section 385 may, in effect, extend
the prisoner's sentence. Thus the statute is subject to serious abuse.
The Matteawan statute' 7 ' for release of prisoners upon expiration of sen-
tence was also amended by chapter 891 of the Laws of 1966. In authorizing
retention of ex-criminals at Matteawan after a section 85 hearing, it suffers
from the same constitutional defects as Dannemora's section 385.
The recent case of Negro v. Dickens172 aptly demonstrates the inability of
169. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
170. Id. at 373-74.
171. N.Y. Corr. Law § 409 (Supp. 1967).
172. 22 A.D.2d 406, 255 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1965).
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Department of Correction psychiatrists to formulate an expert opinion as
to whether a patient in a Department of Correction mental institution, who
is not dangerous to that institution, would be a danger if transferred to a
Department of Mental Hygiene hospital. The petitioner, Negro, who had been
indicted for a crime and found mentally incapable of standing trial, had been
confined in Matteawan for 21 years. The District Attorney told Negro's counsel
that he would consent to the dismissal of the indictment if the Superintendent
at Matteawan would write the District Attorney that "'the patient's behavior
is such that dismissal of the indictment and transfer of the patient to a civil
hospital would not be prejudicial to the public interest.' "17 The Superintendent
wrote petitioner's counsel that "[t]his patient has been neither suicidal nor
assaultive for many years .... For a little over a year he has been on his present
ward, and during that time has not shown any aggressive behavior, and has
participated in some minor ward work."1 74 Nevertheless the Matteawan Superin-
tendent refused to recommend the transfer of the patient to a civil state hopital,
and in a subsequent letter to Negro's counsel, wrote:
I would resent any member of our psychiatric staff at this hospital,
making the decision that any patient is suitable for care in a civil hos-
pital. This is a determination that should be made and must be made
by the Department of Mental Hygiene. Our staff is working in a closed
hospital and they cannot be the authority for the open civil hospitals
of New York State.' 7 5
It is precisely this determination that the 1966 legislation places on the resent-
ful directors of the Department of Correction mental institutions.
IV. SOLVING TrHE SYNDROME
A. Principles and Objectives
Mr. justice Douglas once noted that lawyers are all too apt to search for
existing precedent than to create new precedent."76 The solution to the human
problem of humane treatment of mentally ill criminals must be couched, not in
a discussion of the legality of separating classes of mentally ill persons to give
them inferior treatment, but of the desirability of such discrimination.
The principles advocated by this article are elementary, and, when simply
stated, elicit little controversy.
1. Every mentally ill person is entitled to treatment for his mental ill-
ness.'
77
2. Security measures should not be imposed on a mentally ill person unless
173. Negro v. Dickens, 22 A.D.2d at 410, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735 (1949).
177. See Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally 111, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 59,
86 (1961) ("to each according to need and to none according to legal classification");
T.W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government 11 (1962) ("[Slickness rationally demands
curative treatment.").
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there is need for such measures, as determined by the diagnosis and pathology of
the individual's mental condition. 178
3. Even when security measures are necessary, the emphasis of the mental
hospital should be on treatment of the patient's mental condition, not on main-
taining security.179
It is in the implementation of these principles that obstacles are encountered.
1. The Right to Treatment-and Its Corollary
Until recently, legal thinking has been limited to substantive and procedural
law reform to insure that persons who were institutionalized were actually suffi-
ciently mentally ill to require institutionalization. A second legal purpose has
been to insure that persons institutionalized as mentally ill were considered as
sick people rather than as criminals. Accordingly, legal emphasis has been on
segregation of those admitted as mentally ill in mental institutions and not in-
tegration with those committed as criminals in penal institutions.8 0
Now a "right to treatment" cult has asserted itself.' 81 The "right to treat-
ment" crusaders advocate the creation of a legal right of mentally ill patients
in public mental institutions to adequate mental treatment. They argue that if
a person is incarcerated by the state involuntarily because he needs mental
treatment, the state has the obligation to furnish that treatment. Even if the
commitment test is dangerousness to self or others, since there has been involun-
tary confinement without criminal adjudication, there is a duty on the state to
make that confinement as short as possible, by providing adequate treatment.
Further, adherents to these tenets would enforce this "right to treatment" by
authorizing confined persons to petition the court for the remedy of release in
situations where the state has not fulfilled its treatment obligation. 8 2
The "right to treatment" philosophy has not received immediate and uni-
form acceptance. In 1961, the New York Appellate Division held that the State's
policy of caring for and protecting mentally ill persons, and, if possible, curing
them of disease, does not confer on a mentally ill person a right to release in
the event of claimed inadequate treatment. 183 In memorandum opinion, the
178. See Weihoffen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity,
38 Texas L. Rev. 849, 856 (1960) ("What security measures are needed depends on the
diagnosis of the individual patient's mental condition-not on the type of crime that he
has committed or with which he is charged.").
179. See Sattern, The Concept of Responsibility in Psychiatry and its Relationship to
the Legal Problem of "Criminal Responsibility," 4 Kan. L. Rev. 361 (1956) ("[Tlhe
emphasis would have to be on treatment rather than security for its own sake.").
180. Birnbaum, supra note 7, at 502.
181. See, e.g., Bassioun, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and Treatment:
Medical Due Process, 15 fDe Paul L. Rev. 291 (1966); See also Arens, Due Process and the
Rights of the Mentally Ill: The Strange Case of Frederick Lynch, 13 Cath. U.L. Rev. 3
(1964); Birnbaum, supra note 7.
182. Quaere: If there is no effective treatment method known for a particular illness,
and the committed person is dangerous, what is the state's obligation?
183. People ex rel. Anonymous v. LaBurt, 14 A.D.2d 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't),
appeal denied, 14 A.D.2d 700, 219 N.Y.S.2d 948 (2d Dep't 1961), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d
794, 175 N.E.2d 165, 215 N.Y.S.2d 507, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 428 (1962).
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court stated that recourse for the patient was to the Commissioner of Mental
Hygiene under his statutory power'8 4 to investigate and correct abuses in the
treatment of mentally ill patients.
The "right to treatment" doctrine has been argued in the United States
Supreme Court on an allegation of denial of "medical due process." 185 The
Court, however, decided the case on other grounds.180
In 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
per Chief Judge Bazelon, accepted the "right to treatment" argument in Rouse
v. Cameron.1s7 The statute provided: "A person hospitalized in a public hospital
for a mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and
psychiatric care and treatment.'188 The court broadly construed the statute
to require adequate treatment, and ruled that "[c]ontinuing failure to provide
suitable and adequate treatment cannot be justified by lack of staff or facili-
ties."' 8 9 The court held that the right to treatment is cognizable in habeas
corpus.
It has been prophesied that the right to treatment "will in time be success-
fully claimed as inherent in an expanding concept of due process in the Twenti-
eth Century."' 9 The Rouse decision, being the first judicial recognition of the
right, is a significant step toward the fulfillment of that prophecy.
A mentally ill person, whether he has committed a crime or not, suffers
from a condition that will respond or not respond to psychiatric treatment with-
out respect to the intervention of a "wrongful act."'' Since the criminal status
is irrelevant to the capability to treat, it should be irrelevant to the right to
treatment. To the principle of a "right to treatment" must be added a corollary.
In the attempt to increase the level of treatment of all mental patients, the
level of treatment for any artificially disadvantaged class of patients, for exam-
ple, the mentally ill criminal, must be raised to the level of all other patients.
The norm must be sought for all abnormal. Whatever can be argued regarding
inadequate treatment of civilly committed patients in civil state hospitals, is
even more apparent regarding mentally ill criminals in so-called Department
of Correction mental hospitals. Whether these institutions are in fact hospitals
or prisons, 92 does not dispose of the necessity of providing treatment equal to
184. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 86 (Supp. 1967).
185. Arens, supra note 181, at 31.
186. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). The Court based its decision on the
ground that where an accused disclaims reliance on a defense of mental irresponsibility, the
District of Columbia compulsory commitment statute is not applicable. D.C. Code Ann.
§ 24-301(d) (1967).
187. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
188. D.C. Code Ann. § 21-562 (1967).
189. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
190. Arens, supra note 181, at 30.
191. Rapaport, Remarks, 37 F.R.D. 135 (1965).
192. In United States ex rel. Carroll v. McNeill, 249 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1961) the
appellate court did not set aside the trial court's conclusion that Matteawan is undoubtedly
a hospital and not a jail. The court stated, however, "[wje may well have reached a con-
trary result if the original decision had been ours." Id. at 121.
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that offered in civil hospitals. When necessary, courts in comparing institutions
have even examined those qualities which are incapable of objective measure-
ment.
9 3
The New York Correction Law authorizes the confinement in Dannemora
and Matteawan of mentally ill criminals presently serving sentences, upon a
judicial finding of mental illness.194 Under these statutes, there is no determina-
tion of dangerous mental illness. In Baxstrom, the Supreme Court held that
the commitment of ex-criminals to Dannemora without a judicial determination
of dangerous mental illness available to all other civil patients, was arbitrarily
discriminatory. Is it reasonable for the existing statutes to assume that a con-
vict who becomes mentally ill while serving his sentence is automatically dan-
gerously mentally ill? Does not this impart too much magic to the original imposi-
tion of a criminal sentence? The determination at time of conviction is of
dangerousness, i.e., guilt of a crime, not of dangerous mental illness.
The United States Supreme Court has not considered the issue of whether
the penological process involved in the running of Department of Correction
prisons reasonably justifies the elimination of the procedural safeguard of a
judicial hearing on the issue of dangerous mental illness in the transfer of
mentally ill prisoners, presently serving sentences, to Department of Correction
mental institutions. Unless and until the Supreme Court takes that extra step
and rules as to whether this is a reasonable basis for the classification, it cannot
be said that prior to transfer into a Department of Correction mental institution,
all mentally ill persons are entitled to a judicial determination of dangerous
mental illness on equal protection grounds.
2. The Right to Counsel and the Right to Independent Psychiatric Examination
In Rouse, Chief Judge Bazelon stated, "[T] here may be greater need for
the protection of the right to treatment for persons committed without the
safeguards of civil commitment procedures. . . . [W]e need not resolve the
serious constitutional questions that Congress avoided by prescribing this
right."'195
Among the most urgent unresolved constitutional problems in the commit-
ment of mentally ill criminals are the right to counsel and the right to inde-
pendent psychiatric examination.
Section 35(1) (a) of the New York Judiciary Law, enacted in 1966, autho-
rizes a court to assign counsel to indigents in a habeas corpus hearing inquiring
"into the cause of detention of a person in custody in a state institution, or when
it orders a hearing in a civil proceeding to commit or transfer a person or to
retain him in a state institution when such person is alleged to be mentally ill,
193. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (comparison of law schools).
194. N.Y. Cor. Law § 383 (Dannemora), § 408 (Matteawan) (Supp. 1967).
195. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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mentally defective or a narcotic addict .... "1116 Since Matteawan and Danne-
mora are "state institutions," presumably the courts may appoint counsel for
mentally ill criminals. The wording of section 35, while permitting courts to
appoint counsel, does not require it. In People ex rel. Hernandez v. Johnston,10 7
the Dutchess County Supreme Court, 'construing a similarly permissive stat-
ute,198 held that it was not required to appoint counsel for a Matteawan patient
in a habeas corpus hearing. Subsequent developments may have implicitly over-
ruled that decision.
In People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley0 0 the New York Court of Appeals held
that an indigent mental patient confined in a civil state hospital was entitled
to the assignment of counsel as a matter of constitutional right in a habeas
corpus proceeding brought to establish his sanity. The court based its decision
on the principle of Baxstrom and Gideon v. Wainwright.2 0 0 The only mention of
counsel in Baxstrom was in a footnote in which Chief Justice Warren stated:
1. The State apparently permits counsel to be retained in such
proceedings where the person can afford to hire his own attorney despite
the fact that § 384 makes no provision for counsel to be present. See
1961 Op. N.Y. Atty. Gen. 180, 181. Baxstrom is indigent, however, and
had no counsel at this hearing.201
It remains an open question as to whether the New York Court of Appeals'
reliance on the "footnote principle" of Baxstrom extends the right to counsel in
habeas corpus proceedings to mentally ill prisoners presently serving sentences.
Since the New York Court of Appeals has already recognized the right of a
prisoner serving sentence at Dannemora to raise the issue of his mental illness
by habeas corpus, 20 2 a persuasive argument can be made that the Rogers prin-
ciple will be extended to mentally ill criminals.
The 1966 enactment of section 35(3) of the New York Judiciary Law also
recognized the critical nature of independent psychiatric testimony, by provid-
ing that "the court which ordered the hearing may appoint no more than two
psychiatrists or physicians to examine and testify at the hearing upon the condi-
tion of such person.120 3
Section 35(4) made all expenses for compensation and reimbursement for
attorneys and doctors a state charge20 4 rather than a charge on the county in
196. [1966] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 761, § 6. Quaere: May the courts appoint counsel
for patients transferred to Matteawan pursuant to N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 85 (Supp.
1967), since the issue in their transfer is not merely mental illness, but dangerous mental
illness? It is hoped that N.Y. judiciary Law § 35 will be liberally construed to include
such patients.
197. 47 Misc. 2d 145, 262 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
198. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 32, repealed, [19661 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 761, § 5.
199. 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966).
200. 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
201. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 109 (1966).
202. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, supra note 74.
203. [1966] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 761, § 6 (Emphasis added.).
204. Id.
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which the institution was located.2 0 5 Prior to the amendment, judges in Clinton
County and Dutchess County, where Dannemora and Matteawan are respec-
tively located, were loathe to order independent psychiatric examinations since
the cost was borne solely by those counties. While section 35 does not mandate
an independent psychiatric examination in all cases-leaving the constitutional
question unanswered-the amendment may, as a practical matter, increase
perceptively the number of judicially ordered independent psychiatric examina-
tions.
In DeMarcos v. Overholser,20 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia noted that the right of an indigent person in a mental
hospital to bring a habeas corpus hearing would be valueless
unless expert testimony were available to him to rebut the opinion
evidence of the staff of the institution who believed he should be con-
tinued in custody.
No careful judge is likely to assume the responsibility of allowing
an alleged insane person to go free when the sole expert opinion in the
record advises him that such a course is dangerous to the community.
20 7
For this reason the court considered it more important to provide the pa-
tient with an independent psychiatric examination than to provide him with
counsel.
If, as DeMarcos suggests, independent psychiatric examinations are in
fact more essential than counsel for the full exercise of legal rights by mental
patients, then doesn't the New York Court of Appeals decision requiring coun-
sel, 20 8 a fortiori require independent psychiatric examination for civil patients?
The Baxstrom decision adds credence to this assertion. While the Supreme
Court's footnote mention of counsel was surely oblique-though not so oblique
as to be unusable by the New York Court of Appeals-Chief Justice Warren
commented directly in the body.of the Baxstrom opinion on the relationship of
indigence to psychiatric testimony. Referring to successive habeas corpus hear-
ings, the Court stated: "Due to his indigence and his incarceration in Danne-
mora, Baxstrom could not produce psychiatric testimony to disprove the testi-
mony advanced at the prior hearing. °20 9 If counsel and independent psychiatric
examinations are necessary for patients in civil state hospitals, are they not
equally as necessary for patients confined in Matteawan and Dannemora? 210
205. Compare N.Y. Judiciary Law § 35(4) (1967) with id. § 32 (formerly § 31),
[1915] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 295, renumbered § 32, [1945] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 649, § 17,
repealed, [1966] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 761, § 5.
206. 137 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
207. DeMarcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
208. People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d
573 (1966).
209. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 109 (1966).
210. See Record at 41-45, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The stenographic
transcript of proceedings at Baxstrom's habeas corpus hearing demonstrates the court's
willing reliance on a psychiatric examination conducted over a year before the hearing.
Baxstrom, without an attorney or independent psychiatric testimony or ability to produce
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B. The Principal Obstacles
In 1875, the New York Commissioner in Lunacy stated that when a wrong-
doer becomes mentally ill, "all punishment must be suspended during this inter-
vening state, and the person treated, not as a criminal, but as an ordinary sick
man in a hospital." 211 That solution to the problem is as valid today as when it
was expressed 92 years ago. But it is submitted that the recommendation to
treat mentally ill prisoners for their illness in civil state hospitals would be met
today with violent reaction and rejection. The institutional obstacles to the ra-
tional treatment of mentally ill criminals must be scrutinized.
1. The Failure of Penology
The vital defect in assigning responsibility for treatment of certain men-
tally ill persons to the Department of Correction lies not in its inadequate
buildings and inadequate staff, but in the penal philosophy itself.
The New York Department of Correction handled the actual physical trans-
fer of "Operation Baxstrom" patients from Dannemora and Matteawan to the
civil state hospitals. These trips often lasted for several hours and hundreds of
miles. During the transportation, these mentally ill patients were handcuffed
and chained together.212 It must be remembered that these people, though ex-
criminals, were civil patients and, according to the Supreme Court in Baxstrom,
were entitled to the rights of all other civil patients. How far has New York
advanced since 1788 when the first legislative enactment in the field authorized
the locking up and chaining of lunatics?218 The Department of Correction's pre-
Pinel2 14 penology aptly demonstrates its basic lack of understanding of the
therapeutic approach necessary to treatment of mentally ill patients in the
Twentieth Century.
2. The Failure of Psychiatry
If the New York Department of Mental Hygiene ever accepts the responsi-
bility for treatment of mentally ill criminals, it will first have to overcome re-
sistance within its own ranks.
Within the Department's central office, opposition to the treatment of men-
tally ill offenders has been expressed. Ernst Schmidhofer, M.D., while he was
Deputy Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, wrote:
Of late there seems to be a growing tendency by the courts to apply
improperly psychiatric or psychodynamic principles for the disposition
either, was unable to offer any evidence to refute the stale, year-old finding that he was
mentally ill, or that there had been a change in his mental condition.
211. J. Ordronaux, The Proper Legal Status of the Insane & Feeble-Minded 15 (1875).
212. Statement of Robert C. Hunt, M.D., Asst. Comm'r, N.Y. State Dep't Mental
* Hygiene, to Grant H. Morris, June 24, 1966.
213. [1788] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 31.
214. Philippe Pinel, as chief physician at the Bic~tre in the late 1700's, "took the bold
and unprecedented step of removing the chains from the patients, some of whom bad been
restrained in this way for 30 or 40 years." 17 Encyclopaedia Britannica 942 (1961).
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of adult criminals and juvenile delinquents. Many such people are com-
mitted to state hospitals on very shaky, tenuous, false theoretical con-
siderations.
Few such hospitals have programs which are applicable and almost
none have any which are effective. The hospital society is disrupted by
such persons, just as was the community from which they came. Yet
little change has been brought about in them through so-called psycho-
logic methods of control.
In my opinion, such persons belong not in a state mental hospital
but in a penal institution. The mental hospital of today seems to be
dedicating itself to the perpetuation of narcissism rather than addressing
itself to the promotion of growth.215
The Psychiatric Quarterly is the "Official Scientific Organ of the New York
State Department of Mental Hygiene." The editor of the Quarterly is Newton
Bigelow, M.D., Director of Marcy State Hospital. Dr. Bigelow is also a former
Commissioner of Mental Hygiene. In his editorial comment discussing limitations
on the open hospital concept, he protested legislation authorizing transfer of
sentence-expired ex-prisoners from Matteawan and Dannemora upon a finding
of suitability for treatment at civil hospitals. Dr. Bigelow commented: "These
people were 'criminals' when committed, and although some of them have been
confined for long periods, one may doubt that their proclivities have been al-
tered. 216
It is hoped that the encouraging results of "Operation Baxstrom" will alter
the above-expressed opinions. The "Operation Baxstrom" patients were properly
integrated with other civil patients. After nine months, the Department of
Mental Hygiene has not experienced "any major trouble." 217 There is no indica-
tion that the Baxstrom patients disrupted the civil hospital society and only 6
of 992 evinced dangerous proclivities. The effectiveness of treatment in the civil
hospitals is demonstrated by the absolute discharge of 79 patients, who had
been administratively determined to be dangerously mentally ill, within six
months of transfer to these hospitals.
It is submitted that the integration of Baxstrom patients directly into the
wards of the civil hospitals is largely responsible for the "Operation Baxstrom"
successes. It is not responsive to the problem for the Department of Mental
Hygiene to merely consider the feasibility of acquiring jurisdiction of Mattea-
wan and Dannemora and continue to operate them as maximum security insti-
tutions. Such arrangements in California have been criticized as "prisons in
disguise-barbaric institutions operating under a false front of medical respecta-
bility in which there is not even a pretence of adequate therapy."218
215. Schmidhofer, The Need for More Controls, 7 J. Offender Thearpy 39, 39-40
(1963).
216. Editorial Comment, How Wide is Open?-How High the Moon, 35 Psychiatric
Q. 373 (1961).
217. Letter from C. Stamatovich, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Dec. 21, 1966.
218. Diamond, supra note 177, at 85.
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3. The Failure of Inter-Departmental Cooperation
The argument that mentally ill criminals can be properly treated within
the present bifurcated system does not realistically appraise the existing lack of
cooperation between the two Departments.
Even if jurisdiction over the dangerously mentally ill is retained by the
Department of Correction, the ability to transfer non-dangerous patients out
of maximum security confinement is essential to any rational treatment arrange-
ment. Not only does transfer hasten recovery of those patients who have been
removed to less confining situations, but transfer also makes "it easier to main-
tain security with regard to those patients who remain security risks; the re-
moval of 'safe' patients from the maximum security building allows the atten-
dants to concentrate on a smaller number of truly dangerous individuals." 210
The reluctance of the Department of Mental Hygiene to accept patients
from Department of Correction mental institutions220 is substantiated not only
with reference to ex-criminals and ex-dangerous civil patients, but with all
classes of Correction mental patients. In Negro,221 the District Attorney offered
to dismiss the indictment against a patient who had been in Matteawan for 21
years and Negro's attorney wrote to the Superintendent of Matteawan.
However, the Superintendent declined to recommend dismissal of the
indictment until the Department of Mental Hygiene determined that
petitioner was suitable for care in a civil hospital. Accordingly, counsel
wrote to the Department of Mental Hygiene, but tbt agency appears
to have been of the view that it was for Matteawan to determine
whether "it would be beneficial to the therapy program for this patient
to have his indictment dismissed." The Department of Mental Hygiene
took the position that in the instant case "Matteawan is under the jur-
isdiction of the Department of Correction.222
A subsequent request to the Superintendent of Matteawan met with rejec-
tion and the suggestion that counsel "'refer this matter to the Department of
Mental Hygiene for a decision.' ",223
This dialogue becomes particularly incredulous when one considers that the
Department of Mental Hygiene had sponsored the legislation224 that authorized
transfer of this class of patient upon dismissal of indictment. The Department
had urged that "mentally deranged persons under indictment were held in
close confinement and that '[t]he most effective treatment procedures must
be denied to them because of the restrictive nature of their custody (in Mattea-
wan).' ),225
219. Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey,
supra note 58, at 100.
220. N.Y.U. School of Law Report on Law-Psychiatry Project 5 (1964).
221. Negro v. Dickens, 22 A.D.2d 406, 255 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1965).
222. Id. at 410, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
223. Id.
224. [1958] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 705; "1959] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 337.
225. Negro v. Dickens, 22 A.D.2d at 409-10, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
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Unless there is a complete reversal in Department of Mental Hygiene atti-
tude, it is doubtful that mentally ill criminals, still under sentence, will be wel-
comed into the civil state hospitals.
New York Correction Law sections 375 and 400, referring to Dannemora
and Matteawan respectively, state:
The department of correction shall have the jurisdiction and con-
trol of such hospitals; but it shall be subject to visitation and inspec-
tion of the head of the department of mental hygiene, by himself and
his authorized representatives from the department of mental hygiene.
The Department of Mental Hygiene conducts formal semi-annual inspec-
tions of both institutions. A nine month analysis of "Operation Baxstrom" indi-
cates that only 6 out of 992 patients who were labeled dangerously mentally
ill and confined in Matteawan and Dannemora were actually dangerous. Is it too
harsh to conclude that the Mental Hygiene inspection system failed to remedy
obvious errors in the retention of many patients by the Department of Correc-
tion, and is itself in need of remedy?
Failure to coordinate services for the mentally ill is not always attributable
to the Department of Mental Hygiene. In response to the empty spaces caused
by the "Operation Baxstrom" patient evacuation, the New York Legislature
established a psychiatric and diagnostic clinic at Dannemora. 226 The purpose of
the clinic is to provide
intensive physical, mental and sociological diagnostic and treatment
services for persons who are serving a sentence of imprisonment for a
felony in an institution under the jurisdiction of the department of cor-
rection. The work of the clinic shall also include pre-parole diagnostic
evaluation where requested by the board of parole, and scientific study
of the social and mental aspects of the causes of crime.
227
On December 30, 1966, Dr. Herold reported that the plans had been com-
pleted and that there were 50 patients then in the clinic. He expected an addi-
tional 50 patients early in 1967, with an eventual goal of 200 patients.228
The statute specifically states that "[t]he board of parole and the depart-
ment of mental hygiene are hereby authorized and directed to assist and co-
operate in the conduct of the clinic. .... ',229 However, the Department of
Mental Hygiene reports, "The project at Dannemora is underway, but it is
also under wraps, since our Dept. seems to have been excluded. I do know that
an MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) is required on all
prospective candidates. 2 3 °
226. [1966] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 653. The clinic, while housed in the buildings and
on the grounds of the Dannemora State Hospital, is separate from the hospital in other
ways. Persons transferred into the clinic are considered inmates of Clinton Prison and are
required to be kept "separate and apart" from "inmates and patients" of Dannemora State
Hospital.
227. N.Y. Corr. Law § 71-a (Supp. 1967).
228. Letter from R.E. Herold, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, Dec. 30, 1966.
229. N.Y. Corr. Law § 71-a (Supp. 1967).
230. Letter from C. Stamatovich, M.D., to Grant H. Morris, December 21, 1966.
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4. The Failure of Law
In 1964, the New York Legislature passed a revolutionary 281 law28 2 com-
pletely revising the admissions procedures for hospitalization of mentally ill
persons in civil state hospitals. This legislation was enacted in response to the
report2 13 and recommendations of a special committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York to study commitment procedures. Although
judicial certification for involuntary admission of civil patients was eliminated
and a new system of medical certification was instituted,234 the committee was
concerned that there was "a need during the entire stay in the mental hospital
for objective and periodic examination of a patient's status and right to release.
Especially for the non-voluntary patient, full representation promptly upon ini-
tial admission and regular review of the grounds of his detention are essential
to continuing protection of his rights.. . .235
To meet this need, the Mental Health Information Service was created.2 0
Each of the four judicial departments of the State has such a service. Although
it is primarily a device to insure non-mentally ill members of society that they
will not be "railroaded" unlawfully into mental hospitals, the Service also per-
forms a dual role by providing a valuable service to mentally ill patients properly
confined. Analogously, tranquilizing and other psychiatric drugs do not, in and
of themselves, cure patients. However, they do serve the valuable function of
making patients more amenable to other forms of treatment by breaking down
patients' resistance to that treatment. Similarly, the Mental Health Informa-
tion Service, in answering legal questions of patients and allaying their anxieties
by insuring them that they are not nor will become forgotten patients, increases
the inclination of patients towards treatment.
It is unfortunate-both legally and morally-that the Mental Health
Information Service was not established to protect the rights of all mental
patients, without discrimination between civil and criminal status. It is even
more deplorable that those in greatest need of such a service-the patients at
Matteawan and Dannemora-are deprived of it.
Existing statutes are diametrically opposed to the therapeutic necessities
of visitation and communication. 23 7 Section 388 of the New York Correction
Law provides:
231. Wiley, Legislation Affecting Psychiatry and Mental Health, 65 N.Y.S.J. Medicine
2718, 2722 (1965).
232. [1964) N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 738, effective September 1, 1965.
233. Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York, Mental Illness and Due Process (1962).
234. [1964] N.Y. Sess. Laws d. 738, § 5, repealing N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 74
(admission on court commitment), inserting Id. § 72 (Supp. 1967) (admission on certificate
of two physicians).
235. Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 233, at 19.
236. [1964) N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 738, § 18.
237. For visitation purposes, Dannemora is particularly poorly situated. It is located
in Clinton County in the northeast corner of the state. The surrounding area is sparsely
populated and not easily accessible from major metropolitan areas. It is a full day's journey
to Dannemora by automobile or other land transportation from New York City, Buffalo,
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No person not authorized by law or by written permission from
the commissioner of correction shall visit the Dannemore [sic] state
hospital, or communicate with any patient therein, without the con-
sent of the superintendent; nor without such consent shall any person'
bring into or convey out of the Dannemora state hospital any letter or
writing to or from any patient; nor shall any letter or writing be de-
livered to a patient, or if written by a patient, be sent from the Danne-
mora state hospital until the same shall have been examined and read
by the superintendent or some other officer of the hospital duly autho-
rized by the superintendent. But communications addressed by such
patient to the county judge or district attorney of the county from
which he was sentenced, shall be forwarded, after examination by such
superintendent, to their destination.238
The provision for Matteawan is identical.23 9 An administrative regulation,
promulgated by the Commissioner of Correction, discourages visitation by
requiring visitors to inmates of Correction institutions to be fingerprinted.240
Although members of the immediate families of Matteawan inmates are specifi-
cally excluded from this requirement,2 41 the practice at Matteawan is to finger-
print all visitors.2
42
While defects in recent legislation have been highlighted,243 the existence
of archaic statutes is unjustified. What is the competence of the Commissioner
of Correction to appoint the Superintendents of Dannemora and Matteawan2 44
as well as subordinate officers and employees? 245 Even supposedly liberal legis-
lation is imbued with a repressive philosophy. The Interstate Compact on
Mental Health, designed to facilitate treatment for non-resident mentally ill
persons, expressly excludes mentally ill criminals from its purview.2 46
The courts are not immune from criticism. As yet, no New York court has
considered as significant, the relationship of date of sentence to date of trans-
fer of the prisoner to a Correction mental institution. In one case,2A7 a person
was found guilty of a theft in 1941 and sentenced to prison for three to six
Rochester, or Syracuse, and regular commercial air transportation is nonexistent. It is
ludicrous to expect that patients' families in areas embracing over 90 per cent of New
York's population would be able to visit the institution with any degree of frequency.
Nevertheless, family interest in a mental patient-as demonstrated by frequency of visits'
and letters-is one of the key factors utilized in determining his ultimate release to the
community.
238. N.Y. Corr. Law § 388 (Supp. 1967).
239. Id. § 413.
240. Dep't of Corr., N.Y.C.R.R. § 53.4.
241. Id. § 53.4(d).
242. Statement of W. Cecil Johnston, M.D., to the Spec. Comm. of the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York Studying Commitment Procedures, at Matteawan State Hos-
pital, Beacon, New York, Jan. 15, 1966.
243. See, e.g., [1966] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 891, § 4 discussed in text accompanying
supra notes 160-75.
244. N.Y. Corr. Law §§ 377, 402 (Supp. 1967).
245. Id. §§ 389(3), 414(3).
246. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 145, art. IX(a) (Supp. 1967). See Smith, Psychiatric
Approaches to the Mentally Ill Federal Offender, 30 Fed. Prob. 23 (1966).
247. People ex rel. Kamisaroff v. Johnston, 13 N.Y.2d 66, 192 N.E.2d 11, 242 N.Y.S.2d
38 (1963).
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years. "Only a few days later" 248 he was transferred to Dannemora. In 1963,
when the case reached the New York Court of Appeals, the court did not con-
sider that the original conviction might have been invalid. The defendant
could, and perhaps, should have been found either mentally incompetent to
stand trial or not guilty of the crime by reason of insanity. Transfer to a Cor-
rection mental institution so soon after conviction should necessitiate immedi-
ate judicial inquiry into the legality of the conviction.
Conversely, if a convict is transferred to a Correction mental institution
shortly before his sentence is due to expire, judicial skepticism is needed to in-
sure that confinement in the mental hospital is not used as a device to unlaw-
fully prolong a prisoner's sentence. In Baxstron, the prisoner had served two
years and two months of a two and one half to three year sentence before he
was transferred to Dannemora. The courts did not comment on this feature
of the case.
The legal profession is primarily guilty of sins of omission, rather than
commision. But the chronic neglect of the mentally ill criminal is inhuman and
should be unacceptable to an enlightened Twentieth Century society. The bar
should be reprimanded for its failure to fulfill its obligations to the adversary
system. This writer attended a series of habeas corpus hearings at Matteawan.
I witnessed the pitiful plight of patients seeking discharge or transfer attempt-
ing to present their cases alone against the onslaught of the State's Assistant
Attorney-General and the "expert testimony" of the institution psychiatrists.
There was no justice that day.
V. CONCLUSION
This article is not intended to be an expos6. Rather, it is an indictment of
the penological, medical, and legal professions for the willful destruction of
human life. As high priests of a "fear-crazed" society, they have condemned
mentally sick individuals to a lifeless existence of maximum security confine-
ment, negligible treatment, and worst of all, utter hopelessness.
While destroyed human life cannot be replaced, this article is written in
the belief that basic changes in the system can be made so as to prevent the
repeated occurrence of this most heinous of crimes in the future.
In 1898, S.J. Barrows observed, "Ask what a State does with its insane
prisoners, ask how it protects society on the one hand and fulfills its duty to
an irresponsible member on the other, and we may judge of its degree of ad-
vancement by the response." 249
By that standard, it is submitted, we are still in the middle ages.
APPENDIX: A CASE STUDY WITH COMMENTS
The appendix contains an actual case history of a patient at Dannemora
State Hospital and the comments of the author. The documents composing the
248. Id. at 68, 192 N.E.2d at 12, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
249. S.J. Barrows, supra note 2, at 8.
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case history are found in the files of the Department of Mental Hygiene of the
State of New York. The last name of the patient has been omitted to preserve
the confidentiality of his identity.
The appendix is submitted as an illustration of how the statutes governing
commitment to and retention in Department of Correction mental hospitals have
been administered. The presentation is not intended to illustrate what happens
in the typical case to the typical patient. When the issues are improper care
and treatment with resultant loss of human dignity through long term confine-
ment, there is no such thing as a typical case or a typical patient. There is only
individual tragedy that may or may not be magnified by repetition in other
instances. However, the extent to which the present system encourages these
abuses shuld be viewed as positive evidence of the need for immediate change
and sweeping reform.
The Case of John Leo M.
The fingerprint sheet prepared by the New York State Department of
Correction, Division of Criminal Identification, indicated that John Leo M.
was arrested and charged with rape 1st degree on February 16, 1956. No dis-
position of that charge is indicated.
On December 26, 1956, he was received as a voluntary patient at St.
Lawrence State Hospital, a civil hospital within the New York Department
of Mental Hygiene.
On January 9, 1957, his wife petitioned for John's involuntary court
certification pursuant to section 74 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law.
The doctors who examined him, Dr. A.D. Redmond and Dr. R.D. Stacy,
both of Ogdensburg, filled in point 5 of the "examination by physicians" as
follows:
Typed (5. It is my opinion that personal service on said patientform would be detrimental to said patient for the following rea-
sons.
Personal service would tend to excite the patient and
prove detrimental to his best interests. '
Judge D.E. Sanford who certified John to St. Lawrence State Hospital
wrote:
(2) 1 do hereby certify that I have dispensed with personal
Typed service, or that I have directed substituted service as
form provided by law upon the person hereinafter named for
the following reasons:
would not understand service.
On January 31, 1957, John J. Dorey, M.D., the duly designated medical
officer swore to a certificate of need of continued care and treatment, which,
upon filing in the County Clerk's Office, made the above court order a final order.
On January 28, 1958, John, who had a psychiatric classification of
"psychosis with mental deficiency," was discharged as recovered.
Comment: As to the classification of "psychosis," this is nothing more
than saying the man was sick. There is no known cure for mental deficiency.
Quaere: How is it possible to be released as recovered from psychosis with
mental deficiency? Either the diagnosis, in addition to being vague, was also
inaccurate, or the condition on discharge was inaccurate.
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There is nothing on the official record to show when the crime of arson 3rd
degree was committed by John or when his trial was held, but a notation on
a Department of Mental Hygiene physician's examination indicated that John's
sentence to Clinton Prison and his term of imprisonment began on February
17, 1958.
Comment: Within 21 days of release from St. Lawrence State Hospital as
recovered, John committed a felony, was apprehended, tried, convicted (in part
on his own confession) and sentenced.
On August 12, 1958, Harry L. Freedman, M.D., psychiatrist at Clinton
Prison wrote out a certificate of insanity to have John transferred to Dannemora
State Hospital as an insane person. The report indicated 3 previous stays at
St. Lawrence 12/26/56-4/4/57; 6/21/57-7/10/57; and 9/10/57-10/2/57.
Comment: It should be noted that he was described as of "Dull normal
intelligence, I.Q. 87 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale on 3/1/58."
On August 12, 1958, John was transferred to Dannemora State Hospital
by section 383 of the New York Correction Law. Under the procedure existing
at the time, the warden of the prison, Mr. J. Vernal Jackson, was empowered
to administratively order the transfer of John to Dannemora. He was diagnosed
as Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type.
The statistical data of admissions sheet showed he had completed the 8th
grade of schooling at age 16.
On July 28, 1961, he was produced on a writ of habeas corpus before a
justice of the supreme court. The writ was dismissed.
On November 28, 1961, he was examined by Richard V. Foster, M.D., of
the Department of Mental Hygiene for possible transfer to a civil state hospital
at the expiration of his sentence. Relying on reports of hostility toward at-
tendants and the excitability of the patient, Dr. Foster concluded:
This patient's case will require supervision and precaution exceeding
customary standards of a civil institution. He is not approved for
transfer after commitment.
John's sentence expired on December 24, 1961. He was retained at Danne-
mora thereafter pursuant to section 384 of the New York Correction Law.
December 21, 1961. Letter from Dr. Paul H. Hoch, Commissioner of
Mental Hygiene by D.J. Shea, Secretary, to John, advising him as follows:
I have been directed to inform you that after a thorough study and
evaluation of your record and of the results of your psychiatric exam-
ination, it is believed the facilities and supervision available at the
Dannemora State Hospital are best suited to aid in your case. The
Department does not recommend a transfer to a civil state hospital
at this time.
On July 9, 1962, John wrote to the Department of Mental Hygiene request-
ing transfer to St. Lawrence State Hospital, the civil state hospital near his home.
July 12, 1962. The Commissioner of Mental Hygiene wrote to Dr. Herold,
Acting Director of Dannemora, asking for a descriptive report of any significant
change in John's condition since Dr. Foster's examination of November 28,
1961.
July 13, 1962. Letter from Dr. Herold to Commissioner Hoch:
Dear Sir: There has been no,significant change in the condition of the
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above named patient since his last examination on Nov. 28, 1961. He
is still quite simple in most of his reactions and at times is over-
productive and manneristic. He still expresses some persecutory delu-
sions.
July 19, 1962. Letter from Commission Hoch to John, stating:
We have noted that the report of your condition (received by the
Department from Dannemora) does not contain any evidence of recent
difficulties on the ward, and we hope you improve in your reaction so
we may reconsider you for possible transfer to a civil state hospital
at the proper time. Transfer cannot be recommended now.
May 6, 1963. Letter to Department of Mental Hygiene from John re-
questing examination by Department's Dr. Foster for the purpose of transfer
to St. Lawrence State Hospital.
Comment: The Department of Mental Hygiene allows request for transfer
only once every 6 months.
John stated in the letter of May 6, 1963:
If everyone was lock up for everything He or She had said or wrote
there would be no person left on the Street.
The last few paragraphs of the letter give the general tone:
My freedom means more to me than anything eles [sic] in all the
world.
Therefore I hope and pray that you Doctors and the Doctors
here will forgive me and give me the chance to prove to one and all that
my confinement has help me in many ways.
My poor Mother and family wants me home very bad and I have
tried to do my level best to Prove to the Doctors here that I have fully
recovered.
Furthermore I am not mad at the outside world nor my exwife
or her family and I am telling you all the truth.
I have no evil feelings in any way against any person none what-
soever.
Therefore I believe I am well enough to be let out or trans-
fered to the St. Lawrence State Hospital. I mean let out in care of my
mother and family.
Waiting to see your Doctor soon. Thanking you in advance.
Respectfully yours
John Leo M.
May 8, 1963. Instead of sending a Department of Mental Hygiene doctor,
a letter was sent to Dannemora asking for a descriptive report of any sig-
nificant change in the patient's mental reaction since the last report (July 13,
1962).
May 9, 1963. Letter from Dr. Herold, Director of Dannemora, to Dr. Hoch:
Dear Commissioner Hoch:
On October 26, 1962 the above named patient became very abusive
to some of our officers. Again on January 18, 1963 he assaulted another
patient, threw a book in his face and kicked him.
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He is being cared for on Ward 11 and is working in the Taylor
Shop at the present time. I might also add that he is very much pre-
occupied with his legal affairs.
May 13, 1963. The usual rejection letter was sent by the Department to
John.
July 20, 1963. Letter from Mrs. Florence M., mother of the patient, to
Dr. Hoch stating that the Catholic chaplain of Dannemora, Rev. Cormac A.
Walsh, had written her advising her to contact Dr. Hoch to have John trans-
ferred to St. Lawrence State Hospital. She requested transfer.
July 24, 1963. Letter from Department of Mrs. M. telling her of the
Department's decision not to transfer, made on May 13. She was also advised
that application for transfer could again be made after November 1, 1963.
August 26, 1963. Letter from Dr. Herold to Dr. Hoch as follows:
Dear Sir:
Supreme Court Judge Harold R. Soden held hearings at this
hospital for the above named patients, who had applied for writs of
habeas corpus. In all three cases, the writs were dismissed, however,
Judge Soden suggested that we write to you regarding the possibility
of their transfer to a civil hospital. I am enclosing a brief report on
each one.
One of the patients was John Leo M.
The report mentioned no bad behavior after the January 18, 1963 alleged
book throwing and kicking incident. The Department of Mental Hygiene re-
fused transfer in a letter to Dr. Herold on August 29, 1963, but asked for another
report in 6 months.
Comment: It should be noted that even if the alleged assault occurred,
7 months had elapsed since that incident.
February 3, 1964. Letter from Department of Mental Hygiene to Dr.
Herold requesting descriptive report of any significant change in the patient's
mental reaction.
February 4, 1964. Letter from Dr. Herold to Dr. Hoch stated:
There has been no change in the above named patient's condition
since our last report of August 20th. He is still very litigious and makes
frequent applications for various legal proceedings. On December 16,
1963, an application, submitted to the Supreme Court of Clinton
County for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied; on January 10,
1964, an application submitted to the Supreme Court of the United
States for a writ of certiorari was denied; on January 23, 1964, an
application submitted to the Supreme Court of Clinton County for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus was also denied. At times, he becomes rather
hostile and antagonistic.
At the present time he is being cared for on Ward 11. He is not
receiving any treatment with the tranquilizing drugs at the present
time.
Comment: Is the exercise by a patient of his legal rights viewed as a nega-
tive factor in the decision to transfer him? It should be noted that John's last
recorded bad conduct act had occurred on January 18, 1963, over one year ago.
February 14, 1964. Letter from Dr. Hoch to Dr. Herold stating:
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Thank you for your report of February 4 concerning the
above named patient. This is to advise that Dr. Cohen does not find
him suitable to place on a list for examination at the present time.
January 18, 1965. Letter from John to Department of Mental Hygiene re-
questing a personal interview with a Department doctor to discuss "important
matters" with him.
January 20, 1965. Letter from D.J. Shea, Department Secretary, to John
asking him to "write again stating your problem more clearly ..
January 27, 1965. Long letter from John to Department of Mental
Hygiene requesting personal interview with a Department doctor for purposes
of possible transfer to a civil state hospital. In the letter, John explained the
alleged assault on another patient-now over 2 years old.
I have never been confined in Isolation or Restraint sheet.
I have never refused to work or refused to take Medication although
I have been Placed in the camisole two or three times. The Last time
was around January 20th, 1963 and that was I hit another Patient be-
cause He called me a S.O.B. and that is one name I do not like to be
called, as I have respect for my Mother.
February 8, 1965. D.J. Shea wrote to Dr. Herold requesting a brief report
"of the patient-background and mental condition, including any aspect of his
attitude and/or behavior that might more directly indicate or contraindicate
transfer." Information on the use of psychotropic drugs or other special therapies
was also requested.
February 11, 1965. Letter from Dr. Herold to Dr. Christopher Terrence,
Acting Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, which mentioned the examination
conducted by Dr. Foster of the Department of Mental Hygiene in 1961. The
letter continued:
"So far, many psychiatrists have examined the patient and testi-
fied in court during the last two years but actually he has not been
examined by the Department of Mental Hygiene since November
1961 as mentioned before.
In the hospital here patient is a good worker and has not been in
any difficulties. He is not on any medication and he is residing on Ward
11."
March 3, 1965. Leter from D.J. Shea to John stating that:
Consideration will be given your request for a transfer to a civil state
hospital the next time our psychiatrist visits Dannemora State
Hospital to examine patients for this purpose.
March 8, 1965. Letter from John to Department of Mental Hygiene stating
that he attaches to the letter a petition for a show cause order and he requests a
full discharge.
March 23, 1965. Letter from Dr. Herold to Dr. Terrence, which states
that:
I am enclosing a Petition for a Show Cause Order from John Leo M.,
about whom you have an extensive file.
March 29, 1965. Letter from D. J. Shea to John stating:
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The matter of a discharge does not lie within the province of this
department. I am returning the attached petition which you sent us
and suggest that it be sent to Commissioner Paul D. McGuinness,
Department of Correction if you wish.
April 6, 1965. Letter from Dr. Herold to Dr. Terrence referring to the
letter written to John on March 29, 1965:
From the above mentioned letter it appears that there is some mis-
understanding and I would appreciate it if you could clear up this point
for me. As I understand the meaning of Brunson decision's reference
to section 87.3 of the Mental Hygiene Law, the patient is supposed
to write to the Department of Mental Hygiene for release and not to
the Commissioner of Correction.
April 13, 1965. Letters from E. David Wiley, Counsel of the Department
of Mental Hygiene to John and to Dr. Herold, stating that the Department of
Mental Hygiene was in error and that request for discharge under Section 87.3
of the Mental Hygiene Law must be made to the Commissioner of Mental
Hygiene. John was advised that we would be examined for discharge on the
next visit of a Mental Hygiene psychiatrist.
The next paper in the patient's file is an unsigned document dated June 11,
1965. The paper reads in its entirety:
M., John Leo
Medication-None
11- -59-Fight with another patient placed in camisole
4-19-60-John hit patient B. in O.T. Shop-B instigator
4-29-60-Placed in camisole for refusing to be quiet
10-25-62-Used vile and filthy language to Officer O'Connell. Was
angry because he did not get a special meal with ball players
1-18-63-Assaulted patient W. by throwing a book in his face and
kicking him, placed in camisole
5-27-65-Fight with patient K.-placed in camisole.
Comment: It should be noted that the last mentioned alleged fight oc-
curred over 2 years and 4 months after the account of any other abusive inci-
dent, but only 14 days prior to examination by a Department of Mental Hygiene
psychiatrist for possible transfer to a civil state hospital or even discharge.
June 11, 1965. John was examined by Dr. L.L. Bryan, M.D., Assistant
Commissioner of the Department of Mental Hygiene. The report included the
following findings:
Previous criminal record: Rape 1st degree
History of Violence following Incarceration: None
Behavior during hospitalization (Irritability, threats, assaults): generally
satisfactory
Work record: good
Patient's appreciation of relatives and visits, etc: Appreciates
Interest shown by relatives and frequency or visits or letters: Frequent
visits, packages and letters
Dr. Bryan's written report traced John's hitory and included these state-
ments:
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His previous record was rape first degree but apparently he was not
indicted.
Patient says he escaped 13 times from St. Lawrence State Hospital.
Comment: There is nothing on the record to show that the patient ever
escaped, even once.
Dr. Bryan concluded with these statements:
On May 27, 1965, he was involved in a fight and threw the other pa-
tient to the floor. Patient is well oriented but his judgment is extremely
poor. He says he doesn't think burning a barn was a crime because
there was no insurance on it. His transfer to a civil state hospital is
considered too great a risk and is therefore disapproved.
July 19, 1965. Letter to John from D.J. Shea advising him that the
Department of Mental Hygiene disapproves transfer to a civil state hospital.
Comment: On February 23, 1966, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided the case of Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, and held New York Cor-
rection Law § 384 unconstitutional. Patients committed to Dannemora pursuant
to that statute were "transferred" to civil state hospitals.
March 11, 1966. There is a document in John's file that states that he
was examined and his record reviewed by a four man commission appointed
by the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene. The commission found John to be
"mentally ill and in need of psychiatric care in a civil mental hospital." The
paper was signed by the four doctors:
Dr. Robert Hunt, Assistant Commissioner of the Department of Mental
Hygiene;
Dr. Jacob Schneider, Director of Letchworth Village;
Dr. Irving L. Jacobs, Associate Director of Central Islip State Hospital;
and
Dr. Amore Del Guidice, Assistant Director of St. Lawrence State Hospital.
March 12, 1966. Dr. Izaak Gorlicki and Dr. Wiadyslaw Sulek were the
Dannemora physicians who examined the patient and certified the need for
civil admission.
Comment: Their report contains a statement: "History of many escapes
from St. Lawrence hospital." Again, this is completely unsubstantiated on the
record.
As to John's "mental condition" the examiners said:
Used to be apprehensive, excitable, because of feeling being a
victim of conspiracy. In general he is cooperative with no management
problems.
In the space allotted for response to the statement: "The patient showed
the following psychiatric signs and symptoms" the doctors wrote: "Says now
that his ideas expressed in the past were delusional . . . and wants to forget
the past. He would prefer to go to a hospital near his family."
The question was asked "Does the patient show a tendency to injure him-
self?" Answered "Yes;" to injure others? Answered "Yes." The explanation for
these answers is that he "made homicidal threats."
On March 15, 1966, John was discharged from Dannemora and transferred
to Kings Park State Hospital for further hospitalization. The admitting physi-
cian at Kings Park, Arthur Krell, M.D., a supervising psychiatrist, signed his
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name to the following statement regarding John: "I have examined the above
named patient, and confirm the need for immediate care and treatment for
mental illness."
Comment: John's home and relatives are in Canton, New York-approxi-
mately twenty miles from St. Lawrence State Hospital. Kings Park is over 300
miles from the patient's home. This is obviously a denial of the equal protection
of the laws in violation of the Supreme Court decision. By that decision Danne-
mora ex-prisoners are to be treated as ordinary citizens for purposes of mental
hospitalization. Since Canton, New York is within the St. Lawrence hospital
catchment district, John would have gone to St. Lawrence if he had been in the
community and had become mentally ill.
The recently appointed Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, Alan D. Miller,
M.D., himself appointed Dr. Robert C. Hunt, Assistant Commissioner, in charge
of transfer of Dannemora patients to civil state hospitals. I was informed that
Dr. Hunt ordered John to be sent to Kings Park-an out-of-district order-for
the reason that St. Lawrence is a 100% open hospital and it was felt that John
needed greater supervision and control for his mental condition.
It should be noted that even if there were a valid reason for not sending
John to St. Lawrence, the next closest hospital to his home is Utica State
Hospital-less than 150 miles from Canton, New York. Utica State Hospital
is not a 100% open hospital and has the same type of security ward potentiali-
ties as offered by confinement in Kings Park State Hospital.
April 12, 1966. Letter from John to Dr. Miller, requesting transfer from
Kings Park to St. Lawrence. The reason for the request was given as follows:
It is very inconvenient for my family to visit me here and to
look into my mental condition etc. and to be released in a Convelessence
[sic] Status or to be discharged completely.
April 13, 1966. Letter from Mrs. Florence M., mother of the patient, to
Dr. Alan Miller requesting transfer of her son from Kings Park to a hospital
"nearer home." She stated that:
At this time I am finding it impossible to go this far [to Kings
Park] to visit him. Most of my son's relatives are in the North Country
and distance will prevent visits to John except on rare occasions.
April 27, 1966. Letter from D.J. Shea, to Dr. Charles Buckman, Director
of Kings Park State Hospital:
Dear Mr. Buckman:
The mother of your above named patient as well as the patient
himself have written to this office requesting transfer to a hospital in
upper New York for purposes of visitation. This office will consider
the possible transfer of the patient to Utica State Hospital but before
doing so we ask that you furnish us with a detailed report on this
case. Needless to say we are reluctant to make any move which would
prove dangerous for the patients or employees elsewhere." (Emphasis
added.)
April 29, 1966. Letter from Charles Buckman, M.D., to D.J. Shea:
Dear Sir:
Acknowledging your letter of April 27, 1966 regarding the above
named patient, please be advised that in a recent telephone call from
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the patient's brother he proposed plans for patient's release where
the brother will provide lodging as well as employment for his
brother.
His brother, Edward M., is married and runs a dairy farm in
Canton, St. Lawrence County which is said to be twenty miles away
from St. Lawrence Hospital. Living on his farm is another married
sister and brother-in-law as well as the informant's wife and children.
. The patient is here on a two physician's certificate. He is in good
mental contact and insight, judgment are intact. We have an opinion
that he can be considered for release on convalescent care in the cus-
tody of his family.
We have requested a home study from the Social Service Depart-
ment of the St. Lawrence Hospital. If the home study proves adequate
we plan to place the patient on convalescent care. If the patient is
approved for convalescent care, the family will come for the patient.
(Emphasis added.)
Comment: Dr. Buckman's letter regarding probable release was written
only 6 weeks after two examining physicians at Dannemora found that the
patient showed a tendency to injure himself and others; the director of Danne-
mora petitioned for civil admission of the patient, four doctors of the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene found him to be in need of psychiatric care in a civil
mental hospital; and an admitting psychiatrist at Kings Park had confirmed
his need for immediate care and treatment. Also within that 6 week period, a
decision was made that the patient needed too much supervision to be sent to
a completely open mental hospital.
On May 3, 1966, John signed a voluntary admission form to Kings Park
State Hospital. Although this serves as a conversion from involuntary to
voluntary status, the same form is used for both admission and conversion.
The application read:
I desire ( ) to be received
( ) to have my
John L.M.
......................... ......................... received
(relationship) (name and age)
as a voluntary patient for care and treatment at the Kings Park State
Hosp.
Part B of the form commanded a statement of the reasons that hospitaliza-
tion was requested. This section was left blank.
Comment: It is inconceivable that John really desired to be cared for and
treated at Kings Park State Hospital.
May 6, 1966. Letter from Dr. Charles Buckman to D.J. Shea:
Dear Sir:
This is to advise that the above named patient was placed on
convalescent care in the custody of his brother, Edward M., Canton, St.
Lawrence County, N.Y.
Prior to his placement on convalescent care his status was changed
from a two physicians' certificate to a voluntary.

